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Abstract 
This research investigates Denial of Service (DoS) attacks targeting the Internet’s Application 
Layer protocols, namely Session Initiation Protocol (SIP), and SPDY, the proposed second 
version of the Hyper Text Transfer Protocol (HTTP 2.0). The attack detection methodology was 
set using a Statistical Process Control (SPC) technique and Monitoring charts, as well as 
Cumulative Summation (CUSUM) and Exponential Weighted Moving Average (EWMA). The 
techniques tackle different possible flooding attacks, typically through monitoring the incoming 
messages. The system works by sensing sudden changes and detecting abnormal traffic increases 
alerting for an attack, and then triggering an alarm on the DoS attack. The scenarios are designed 
for SIP to simulate normal traffic behaviour and attack traffic behaviour; some scenarios were 
set to have a large ratio of the non-acknowledged requests, and another scenario was set to 
simulate a slight increase in the ratio. There was a scenario in which its traffic was imported from 
another SIP related research. In addition, the thesis discusses the results of DoS attacks targeting 
the SPDY protocol; one scenario is about a large increase in the total number of the sent requests 
by a user towards a SPDY proxy, and another scenario is set with a slight increase. SPC was 
tested on all previously mentioned scenarios; they have shown significant results in detecting the 
attacks, either it was large sudden flooding, or slight low rate DoS flood, as the low rate DoS 
attacks are very difficult and sometimes impossible to detect. SPC was tested to aim in false 
attack alarms reduction, as they are also difficult to deal with. These techniques were applied in 
two approaches: in the first approach, the Offline implementation, the statistical values of the 
whole observations, the mean and the standard deviation, are found and then applied to the 
equations. In the second approach, the Online implementation, the statistical values were updated 
on getting a new observation and immediately applying the SPC equations; there has not been 
any other research that discussed such an approach. The first approach represents a system with 
previous knowledge and experience of the ongoing traffic. This reduces the overhead spent in 
finding the mean and the standard deviation every time a new observation is added to the 
sequence. The second approach represents a system that is newly starting with no knowledge, or 
a system which was reset after detecting an attack. Finally, a framework was suggested to 
effectively employ the previous contributions in detecting the flood of the traffic. 
Key words: DoS, SIP, SPDY, HTTP, SPC, CUSUM, EWMA, traffic behaviour. 
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 Introduction 
A network service can be any kind of application or legitimate activity offered over the 
Internet, which is used by a computing system or by an end user, such as web browsing, 
video and audio conferencing and broadcasting. Security goals of an information system 
are Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability, the (CIA) Triad. The Availability goal is to 
make sure that a service or several services, or a running system offering some services, is 
obtainable during all the dedicated running time. Denial of Service (DoS) attacks aim to 
prevent the availability; it purposes to temporarily or indefinitely interrupt, suspend, or at 
least to reduce the access to the available service on a specific victim. In other words, 
technically DoS attacks attempt to exhaust resources on targeted victims, mainly network 
bandwidth, memory and data storage, processing unit, or energy. 
 Objectives 
 This thesis aims to give an overview of Denial of Service (DoS) attacks targeting 
Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) and SPDY, the future HTTP 2.0. 
 The focus of the DoS security issue in this research is the messages flooding type of 
DoS attack, which is the most common type of DoS. 
 Show the impact of flooding DoS attacks and defence against them using the traffic 
flow behaviour of SIP and SPDY. 
 Utilise SIP and SPDY traffic behaviour to monitor the ongoing flow and sense any 
change in the behaviour to detect a flooding DoS. 
 Utilise the Statistical Process Control (SPC) techniques, the Monitoring Charts, 
mainly Cumulative Summation (CUSUM), and Exponentially Weighted Moving 
Average (EWMA), to monitor the traffic for flow abnormalities. 
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 Run several simulation scenarios based on the behaviour of each SIP and SPDY, 
simulate flood behaviour, and simulate CUSUM and EWMA to detect the flood. 
 Study the slow rate of DoS flooding and the reduction of triggered false alarm issue 
using the SPC techniques. 
 Motivations 
The flooding type of DoS attacks are still an open issue; an attacker finds it an easy way to 
target a certain system and apply a bulky impact on the victim and stop it from offering its 
services for a valuable period of time, so there has not yet been a final optimal solution to 
such a problem. 
The application level protocols are often the common protocols non-expert users deal with 
in the Internet, and such a thing eases the mission for a less expert attacker to be involved 
in malicious activity that effectively harms and results in damaging other systems on the 
Internet. Therefore an attacker requires less effort to launch a flooding Denial of Service 
attack (DoS) against a victim, than the effort needed to perform other types of security 
attacks. 
SIP is the protocol which is responsible for managing multimedia sessions on the internet; 
the networked media are non-tolerant services, denying a service will cause huge damage 
on such a service. 
SPDY is the current draft for the future HTTP 2.0, which means it will be the main 
application protocol for the everyday usage of the web; the flow behaviour of SPDY makes 
it an easily vulnerable target by flooding DoS attacks. 
Traffic monitoring using Statistical Process Control allows useful techniques to observe 
flow behaviour of SPDY and SIP, and to implement the defence techniques against the 
flooding DoS attacks. 
 Thesis Contribution 
The thesis has contributed to the field of Computer Science; the areas the research includes 
are Computer Networks, their Applications and Security, Internet traffic flow and 
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behaviour, message flooding and DoS attacks, and the field of Statistical Process Control 
(SPC) and Monitoring Charts. 
Cumulative Summation (CUSUM) and Exponentially Weighted Moving Average 
(EWMA) are the two main techniques used from SPC to detect flooding DoS. The detection 
was proven to work on large numbers as it was tested in SPDY simulated traffic; in addition 
the detection was proven to work on small numbers as the techniques were tested in SIP. 
The techniques used were proven to detect the slow rate DoS flood, which also helped to 
reduce the False Alarm that might happen. The main contributions are listed here: 
 DoS attacks are characterised as a high sudden increase in the traffic received by a 
certain service. SPC techniques were used to classify such an increase, and to set a 
threshold to classify abnormal traffic behaviour as an attack.  
 Elimination of false flooding DoS alarms was discussed and optimised by setting an 
alert limit using SPC equations to raise the suspicion before triggering the attack’s 
alarm. 
 With slow rate DoS flood detection, such an attack is difficult or impossible to detect 
in most cases. SPC techniques were used to set a threshold that detects a very slight 
and unnoticeable increase in the received flow. A continuous slow increase will 
accumulate in the results of the SPC equations that will be sensed by the alert and 
alarm limits. 
 The utilisation of SIP flow behaviour, the two way communication, request/response 
ratio, and the utilisation of SPDY proposed flow behaviour, where a client sends a 
single TCP stream to the SPDY proxy server, to retrieve all the objects and the web 
resources needed. 
In order to illustrate the areas, the concept, and the different cases that have been examined 
within this research and thesis, a matrix model adds up what has been already mentioned 
as components with the relationships between them, and how they connect with each other. 
Figure 1-1 shows the Matrix Model which consists of the utilised SPC techniques and how 
they were applied, with each type of the quantitative observation input, the tested 
application protocols and the traffic flow behaviour of each protocol, the different scenarios 
of each protocol’s flow behaviour, and the classes of the defence against the DoS flood 
attacks. 
Chapter 1 
 
4 
 
Figure 1-1: Contributions Matrix 
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 Thesis Outline 
The second chapter introduces the Computers Networks and Security, and the Internet 
Applications, definition of SPDY, Denial of Service, and Session Initiation Protocol. 
The third chapter is about the Quality Control and Statistical Process Charts (SPC), 
Cumulative Summation (CUSUM), and Exponential Weighted Moving Average (EWMA). 
Chapter four is about Denial of Service targeting Session Initiation Protocol, and how 
CUSUM and EWMA were implemented to detect the attacks. 
Chapter five is about Denial of Service targeting SPDY, and how CUSUM and EWMA 
were implemented to detect the attacks. 
Chapter six describes a framework for a design to apply and employ the powerful technique 
of SPC in detecting DoS attacks. 
Finally, chapter seven presents the conclusion and the future work related to the research. 
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 The Computer Network Applications and 
Security 
 Networks and Internet Applications 
The Internet protocol stack was designed to provide structure to the design and 
organisation, and define services’ functionality of network protocols [5], [55], and [89]. 
The Application Layer is the location of the internet protocols and its applications that end 
users deal with either at the start or the end of the data communications. Application layer 
protocols are implemented in software in the end systems, distributed over multiple end 
systems, and the exchanged packet of information at the application layer is expressed as a 
message [55]. Figure 2-1 shows the Five-layer Internet protocol stack, where the 
Application Layer is on the top of the stack. 
 
Figure 2-1: Five-layer Internet protocol stack 
Internet applications are vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS) attacks, especially the 
message flooding attacks, as all that an attacker has to do is to send a swarm of data packets 
targeting a certain Internet application. The behaviour of data traffic of the communicating 
application layer protocols is a key element in detecting flooding DoS attacks. The vast 
majority of the inter-connected application and services have similar traffic behaviour 
regardless of the running protocols in the bottom layers. The flow behaviour is a two-way 
Physical 
Data Link 
Network 
Transport 
Application 
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communications, request/response or, in other words, a Connection Oriented 
communication; this means any sent request must be acknowledged with one or more 
responses. This behaviour was used as the principle in this research for detecting DoS, 
simply a noticeable difference between the requests and the acknowledged responses 
indicates a flooding attack is in progress and targeting the system hosting the running 
application. 
Two main protocols are used in the daily life of the internet: the Hyper Text Transfer 
Protocol (HTTP), and the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP). These were the protocols used 
in the study. HTTP is the protocol responsible for web services access; so far, HTTP 1.0 
and HTTP 1.1 are the only versions formally used, and SPDY is the draft for the near future 
HTTP 2.0. SIP is a protocol that is responsible for managing, creating, and finalising 
multimedia sessions over the internet. Its job is not to carry multimedia messages; this is 
the job of other protocols, e.g. the Real Time Protocol (RTP). 
 Session Initiation Protocol 
Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) is a protocol that is responsible for creating sessions for 
multimedia communication, i.e. Voice, VoIP, real-time video stream, remote conferences 
[52] and [53]. SIP is also responsible in managing the session during its run, and to finalise 
the session. 
SIP design employs elements similar to the HTTP request/response transaction model. Each 
transaction consists of a client request that invokes a particular method or function on the 
server with at least one response. SIP reuses most of the header fields, encoding rules and 
status codes of HTTP, providing a readable text-based format. SIP clients typically run over 
either the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) or the User Datagram Protocol (UDP) on 
port numbers 5060 or 5061, or both. 
RFC 2543 in [53] defines the main elements of a SIP Logical network over the internet: 
1. SIP user agent (UA) is a logical network end point element; it is used to create or 
receive SIP messages and thereby participate in managing a SIP session. A SIP UA 
can perform the role of a User Agent Client (UAC), which sends SIP requests, and 
the User Agent Server (UAS), which receives the requests and returns a SIP response. 
These roles of UAC and UAS only last for the duration of a SIP transaction. 
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2. Proxy server is an intermediary entity that acts as both a server and a client for the 
purpose of making requests on behalf of other clients. A proxy server primarily plays 
the role of routing, which means its job is to ensure that a request is sent to another 
entity "closer" to the targeted user. Proxies are also useful for enforcing policy (for 
example, making sure a user is allowed to make a call). A proxy interprets and, if 
necessary, rewrites specific parts of a request message before forwarding it. 
3. Registrar is a server that accepts REGISTER requests and places the information it 
receives in those requests into the location service for the domain it handles. 
4. Redirect server is a user agent server that generates (3xx) responses to requests it 
receives, and further action needs to be taken (typically by sender) to complete the 
request, by directing the client to contact an alternate set of URIs. The redirect server 
allows SIP Proxy Servers to direct SIP session invitations to external domains. 
SIP is a text-based protocol with syntax similar to that of HTTP. So there are two different 
main types of SIP messages: requests and responses. The first line of the head of a request 
has a method, defining the nature of the request, and a Request-URI, indicating where the 
request should be sent. The first line of a response has a response code. The main Request 
methods are:  
1. REGISTER: Used by a UA to indicate its current IP address and the URIs for which 
it would like to receive calls. 
2. INVITE: Used to establish a media session between user agents. 
3. ACK: Confirms reliable message exchanges. 
4. CANCEL: Terminates a pending request. 
5. BYE: Terminates a session between two users in a conference. 
6. OPTIONS: Requests information about the capabilities of a caller, without setting up 
a call. 
The SIP response types are three digits decimal, the most significant digit (far left) defines 
the type of the response; 
1. Provisional (1xx): Request received and being processed. 
2. Success (2xx): The action was successfully received, understood, and accepted. 
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3. Redirection (3xx): Further action needs to be taken (typically by sender) to complete 
the request. 
4. Client Error (4xx): The request contains bad syntax or cannot be fulfilled at the server. 
5. Server Error (5xx): The server failed to fulfil an apparently valid request.  
6. Global Failure (6xx): The request cannot be fulfilled at any server. 
Figure 2-2 below shows the main transactions to start a multimedia call, i.e. a VoIP call. 
An INVITE message is sent by a source agent to the proxy server first, and then forwarded 
to the destination agent. Then the destination replies with 200 OK response. The 
multimedia session starts afterwards, such as VoIP or video. After the multimedia 
transmission finishes, SIP again works to finalise the connection by sending a BYE request 
by one of the agents, and responding with an OK response to the other agent. 
 
 
Figure 2-2: SIP main flow of VoIP call transactions 
Chapter 2 
 
10 
 Hyper Text Transfer Protocol (HTTP) 
The Hyper Text Transfer Protocol (HTTP) is an application protocol for distributed, 
collaborative, hypermedia information systems. HTTP is the foundation of data 
communication for the World Wide Web. Hypertext is structured text that uses logical links 
(hyperlinks) between nodes containing text. HTTP is the protocol to exchange or transfer 
hypertext, which provides for Web document request and transfer, [121] and [124]. 
The standards development of HTTP was coordinated by the Internet Engineering Task 
Force (IETF) and the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C), culminating in the publication 
of a series of Requests for Comments (RFCs), most notably RFC 2616 (June 1999), which 
defines HTTP/1.1, the version of HTTP in common use. 
HTTP is implemented in two programs: a client program and a server program. The client 
program and server program, executing on different end systems, talk to each other by 
exchanging HTTP messages. HTTP defines the structure of these messages and how the 
client and server exchange the messages. 
A Web document or a Web page consists of a base HTML file and several referenced 
objects. An object is simply a file that is addressable by a single URL. An object could be 
an HTML file, a JPEG image, a Java applet, or a video clip. A Web page may contain a 
variety or a combination of all objects. 
HTTP uses TCP as its underlying transport protocol; this may be either a persistent or a 
non-persistent HTTP. In non-persistent HTTP a brand new connection must be established 
and maintained for each requested object. This can place a significant burden on the Web 
server, which may be serving requests from hundreds of different clients simultaneously 
for each of these connections. TCP buffers must be allocated and TCP variables must be 
kept in both the client and server. 
With persistent connections, the server leaves the TCP connection open after sending a 
response. Subsequent requests and responses between the same client and server can be 
sent over the same connection, an entire web page can be sent over a single persistent TCP 
connection when all its objects reside on the same server; multiple web pages residing on 
the same server can be sent from the server to the same client over a single persistent TCP 
connection. But if there are several objects on several servers, which are now the most 
Chapter 2 
 
11 
common in the current complex web pages, there is a need to open multiple connections of 
TCP. 
The most common methods of HTTP request messages are GET, POST, HEAD, PUT, and 
DELETE. The great majority of HTTP request messages use the GET method. The GET 
method is used when the browser requests an object. An HTTP client often uses the POST 
method when the user fills out an HTML form. The HEAD method is similar to the GET 
method: when a server receives a request with the HEAD method, it responds with an HTTP 
message but it leaves out the requested object. For this reason, the HEAD method is often 
used for debugging. The PUT method is often used in conjunction with Web publishing 
tools. It allows a user to upload an object to a specific path on a specific Web server. The 
PUT method is also used by applications that need to upload objects to Web servers. The 
DELETE method allows a user or an application to delete an object on a Web server.  
Some common status codes and associated phrases include: 
 200 OK: Request succeeded and the information is returned in the response. 
 301 Moved Permanently: Requested object has been permanently moved; the new 
URL is specified in Location: header of the response message. The client software 
will automatically retrieve the new URL. 
 400 Bad Request: This is a generic error code indicating that the request could not be 
understood by the server. 
 404 Not Found: The requested document does not exist on this server. 
 505 HTTP Version Not Supported: The requested HTTP protocol version is not 
supported by the server. 
2.3.1 HTTP 2.0 / SPDY 
SPDY protocol is a new application-layer communication protocol that was proposed by 
Google in order to overcome the defects of HTTP [100] and [102]. SPDY has been studied 
in the IETF standardisation process that would be used as a basis of the technical 
specification of the HTTP 2.0 protocol, [32], [73] , [93], and [95]. SPDY is a protocol to 
realise high-speed Web access by using the SPDY session that has been established 
between the client and the Web server for transmitting and receiving page resources. Since 
a modern Web page usually consists of multiple page resources that are stored in multiple 
domains (multi-domain configuration), the client has to establish multiple SPDY sessions 
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with multiple Web servers. In this case, SPDY is not able to realise high-speed Web access 
since it takes several seconds to establish multiple SPDY sessions in a mobile environment 
with high latency [31]. 
On the basis of the HTTP protocol, SPDY offers four improvements to shorten the page 
loading time: multiplexed requests, prioritised requests, server pushed streams and 
compressed headers. Most of these techniques are already implemented in Performance 
Enhancing Proxies (PEP) [1], [13], [17], [37], [78], and [79]. One of the bottlenecks of 
HTTP implementation is that HTTP relies on multiple connections for concurrency. This 
causes several problems, including additional round trips for connection setup, slow start 
delays, and connection rationing by the client, where it tries to avoid opening too many 
connections to any single server. HTTP pipelining helps, but only achieves partial 
multiplexing. In addition, pipelining has proven to be non -deployable in existing browsers 
due to intermediary interference. 
SPDY adds a framing layer for multiplexing multiple, concurrent streams across a single 
TCP connection (or any reliable transport stream). The framing layer is optimised for 
HTTP-like request response streams, such that applications that run over HTTP can today 
work over SPDY with little or no change on behalf of the web application writer. Figure 
2-3 shows SPDY traffic flow. 
The SPDY session offers four improvements over HTTP: 
1. Multiplexed requests: There is no limit to the number of requests that can be issued 
concurrently over a single SPDY connection. 
2. Prioritised requests: Clients can request certain resources to be delivered first. This 
avoids the problem of congesting the network channel with non-critical resources 
when a high-priority request is pending. 
3. Compressed headers: Clients today send a significant amount of redundant data in 
the form of HTTP headers. Because a single web page may require 50 or 100 sub 
requests, this data is significant. 
4. Server pushed streams: Server Push enables content to be pushed from servers to 
clients without a request. 
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Figure 2-3: SPDY communication flow 
SPDY attempts to preserve the existing semantics of HTTP. All features such as cookies, 
ETags, Vary headers, Content-Encoding negotiations, etc., work as they do with HTTP; 
SPDY only replaces the way the data is written to the network. 
Form [36], Multiplexed streams – The fundamental enhancement of SPDY is that multiple 
resources can be retrieved via a single TCP connection. The expectation (and current 
implementation in Google Chrome) is for the client to open a single TCP connection to 
each server, and to request all resources of the server over that single connection. The use 
of a single TCP connection in this way allows the congestion avoidance algorithm in TCP 
to more effectively manage data flow across the network. Also, the client can include 
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multiple requests in a single message, thereby reducing overhead and the number of round-
trip times necessary to begin file transfer for requests beyond the first. Although this is 
similar to HTTP pipelining, the difference introduced by SPDY is that the server can 
transfer all of the resources in parallel (multiplexed) without the “head of line blocking” 
problem that can occur with HTTP pipelining. 
The interaction property of SPDY protocol was analysed in [102], according to the SPDY 
protocol draft specification, and a novel test was implemented by using Testing and Test 
Control Notation version 3 (TTCN - 3) [28]. A SPDY accelerator has been proposed in [31] 
that can considerably accelerate Web access speed by combining the SPDY protocol and 
cache system even in a multi-domain configuration. They have confirmed that the proposed 
system can reduce the page-loading time by one third compared to the existing SPDY. 
Using extensive experiments, SPDY's performance was evaluated in [127]. They identified 
the impact of network characteristics and website infrastructure on SPDY's potential page 
loading benefits; they found that these factors are decisive for an optimal SPDY 
deployment strategy, and they found SPDY offers maximum improvement over HTTPS 
when operating in challenging environments such as low bandwidth and high delay 
situations. A wider debate is taking place regarding the impact of future protocols, through 
exploring the previous key aspects that affect SPDY, and accordingly HTTP/2.0. 
 
SPDY is expected to provide benefits for satellite communications resource management 
[1], which are adopted in geostationary satellite systems to optimise TCP-based application 
performance. They have provided a careful assessment of SPDY performance over satellite 
links, compliant to Digital Video Broadcasting - Return Channel via Satellite or Return 
channel over system (DVB - RCS) standard, with return link resources assigned on demand 
through a Demand Assignment Multiple Access (DAMA) method. Such a reference 
scenario constitutes a challenging communication environment due to both the limited 
return link bandwidth and the relatively high latency. Performance evaluation has been 
carried out through a satellite network emulator, which reproduces physical layer satellite 
impairments, while running real implementations both the TCP/IP stack and SPDY. 
C. Mueller et al. in [15] and [16] discussed MPEG Dynamic Adaptive Streaming over 
HTTP (DASH) as a new streaming standard, , the ISO/IEC MPEG standard, which enables 
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the convenient and smooth transportation of multimedia data to heterogeneous end devices 
over networks with variable bandwidth conditions. 
A design and prototype was proposed in [133]; the implementation was a cross-platform 
mobile activity monitoring system on the mobile cloud computing, as mobile cloud 
computing is becoming a hot topic of the industry, especially in healthcare. Using a 
combination of mobile computing and cloud computing, they described their system which 
incorporates HTTP 2.0 with SPDY to enable a secure and fast server push of medical 
information to individual users. Moreover, the system uses MATLAB graphs to show the 
vital data and analysis results and provides a user-friendly way to access personalised 
healthcare. A hypothesis about smart grids end users was shown in [92], which these links 
can be used to exchange data between the meter/controller, at the user, and a service, at the 
web, using application protocols SPDY and HTTPS. This hypothesis is verified studying 
the connectivity capabilities/constraints that a third party service may experience in 
broadband links. A quantitative evaluation was performed in an emulated IPv6 network to 
delimit the throughput, latency and reliability available to smart grids services. The results 
showed that SPDY and HTTPS can meet typical QoS requirements using a proper 
architecture (e.g. centralised or distributed), and can drive the development of new web-
based energy services. Here, practical connectivity aspects to deploy such services are 
discussed. 
 Security Goals: CIA and DAD Triads 
Within the Computer and Information Security community, professionals and practitioners 
tend to describe security as the sum of its component parts: Confidentiality, Integrity, and 
Availability (CIA). These are the three requirements that users demand from information 
systems, and they are the corner stones of any well-designed information security program. 
Together, these three attributes are known as the CIA triad. Malicious individuals or, in 
other words, attackers, have a model of their own—the Disclosure, Alteration, and Denial 
(DAD), which outlines the three primary mechanisms used to defeat the security goals of 
an organization [67]. 
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Figure 2-4: Security CIA and DAD Triad 
 
2.4.1 Confidentiality 
Confidentiality is the most commonly cited goal of information security programs; simply 
no end user is keen to get their confidential information falling into the hands of 
unauthorised personnel. The security community invests a large amount of time and money 
in developing and implementing systems to ensure that the goal of confidentiality is 
maintained. Access controls protect the confidentiality of data by preventing unauthorised 
personnel from entering a system and preventing legitimate users from accessing 
information that they are not authorised to access. Encryption systems software implements 
mathematically designed algorithms to prevent a third party who intercepts a message from 
determining the contents of the communication. This type of technology facilitates the 
confidential exchange of information over an otherwise insecure communications channel, 
such as the Internet. 
Disclosure occurs when an unauthorised party abuses Confidentiality, and gains access to 
the confidential information. It occurs when security professionals fail, in one way or 
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another, to achieve the CIA triad’s goal of confidentiality. Examples of actions that 
constitute disclosure include:  
1. An attacker gains access, without any authorised permissions, to a certain system and 
reads confidential information. 
2. An insider disseminating confidential information to unauthorised third parties. 
3. A programming failure that causes customers accessing a Web site to see the account 
information of other customers. 
2.4.2 Integrity 
Organizations also charge security practitioners with protecting the integrity of 
organizational data. The basic definition of integrity is ensuring that data may be modified 
only through an authorised mechanism. Integrity involves protecting data from the 
following types of unauthorised modification: 
1. Unauthorised users altering data, such as an attacker breaking into a database and 
altering records. 
2. Authorised users making unauthorised changes to data, such as a bank teller adding 
money to his personal account, rather than that of the customer. 
3. Data being altered through an inappropriate mechanism, such as a power surge 
causing database corruption. 
It is the responsibility of security professionals to ensure that these eventualities do not 
come to fruition, using many of the mechanisms used to protect the confidentiality of data, 
which are also used to protect the integrity of data. For example, access control mechanisms 
help prevent the first two types of data modification in the preceding list. Encryption 
systems use digital signature technology to prevent the modification of data by an 
unauthorised (either accidental or malicious) mechanism. 
Data Alteration occurs when security mechanisms fail to ensure the integrity of data. As 
mentioned in the discussion of integrity, there are a number of ways that this could occur. 
The reader should keep in mind that unauthorised alteration can be the result of either 
malicious or accidental activity. 
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2.4.3 Availability 
The third goal of information security programs is to guarantee the availability of 
information systems and services; the ability of authorised users to access data for 
legitimate purposes. After all, an organization's data is not useful if it is not available for 
its intended use. An attacker who manages to prevent authorised access to a system may 
often be considered just as successful as one who manages to steal or manipulate the data 
stored within it.   
Denial occurs when events take place that prevent authorised users from accessing a system 
for legitimate reasons. This includes actions as basic as a computer crashing, leaving users 
unable to access it until IT professionals restore it to proper working order or bring a backup 
system online. It also includes an entire class of malicious activity known as Denial of 
Service or DoS attacks. Over the past few years, DoS attacks have become more prevalent 
and dangerous as attackers harness the power of many computers worldwide to flood a 
target system with traffic. This kind of attack will be further explored within this thesis, 
which is the purpose of the research. 
 Computer Security and Denial of Service 
2.5.1 Definition 
Availability is one of the information and systems security goals; that is, to make sure that 
some services or running system offering some services are available all the time. Denial 
of Service (DoS) attacks aim to prevent availability, or at least reduce the access to the 
available service on a specific victim. More precisely, DoS attacks attempt to exhaust 
resources on targeted victims; mainly network bandwidth, memory, and processing unit. 
There have been several RFCs and IETF internet drafts about DoS attacks as in [22], [48], 
[68], [70], [84], [90], and [119]. 
A service offered by any computing system can be any kind of  legitimate activity that can 
be used by any other computing system or an end user; for example, web browsing, email 
system, video and audio broadcasting. 
There are too many ways to attack a specific target or set of targets; any kind of attack that 
results in temporal unavailability for some offered service, without even causing any 
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corruption or deletion of any data is considered as a Denial of Service attack. The main and 
the most well-known method of DoS attack is to send a massive number of messages and 
internet data packets over what can be handled by a certain victim’s system, so the victim 
starts receiving data chunks from its network interface, filling up the internal memory by 
storing the received massages, and using its CPU to spend a longer time in processing what 
is required in these messages. 
From [5], all network servers can be subject to DoS attacks that attempt to prevent 
responses to clients by tying up the resources of the server. It is not possible to prevent such 
attacks entirely, but you can do certain things to mitigate the problems that they create. 
Often the most effective anti-DoS tool will be a firewall or other operating-system 
configurations. For example, most firewalls can be configured to restrict the number of 
simultaneous connections from any individual IP address or network, thus preventing a 
range of simple attacks. Of course, this is no help against Distributed Denial of Service 
attacks (DDoS). 
Any kind of computing related system, whether it is physical or a service, is vulnerable to 
DoS attacks: targeted victims were mentioned in RFC 4732 [68], mainly: 
 End Systems are the most common victims, such as web servers, firewalls and IDS 
systems, DNS systems, or any other normal host. To exhaust the resources of a 
running application or the Operating System itself, an attack can be made by 
exploiting poor software quality, such as buffer overflow, or any other attack that 
causes the system to crash and stop. 
 Routers: DoS attacks that make routers unavailable are very serious. Preventing a 
router’s offered service can sometimes put that router in a critical state and the attack 
impact can prevent a lot of users and other routers from communicating with each 
other, therefore many services will be stopped from being accessible. An 
Autonomous System (AS) within routing would be down due to a DoS attack, 
especially if the attacked router was a gateway to a subnet, or it could be the router 
connecting to other routers in a certain area or other areas. A router can be attacked 
as a normal computing end system, or an attack can be performed on a router using 
the routing protocols, [18], [120], [60], [20], and [3]. RFC 3882 [22] has presented a 
Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) configuration to Block Denial of Service Attacks. 
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 Links: sending enough non-congestion controlled traffic such that a link becomes 
excessively congested, and legitimate traffic suffers unacceptably high packet loss. 
For wireless access, a strong frequency conflict can be a cause for a DoS attack. Any 
kind of physical damage could be considered as an attack; for example, cutting a 
power cable or destroying an access link will definitely stop a system and the services 
running on it. 
 Ongoing communications: a reset towards that connection or to de-synchronise it, so 
there will be no further date communication progress. A malicious user might be 
able to significantly reduce the throughput of an on ongoing connection, [87] and [4]. 
An example of disrupting an ongoing communications: a SIP flow can be interrupted 
by some attacker spoofing one of the communicating entities, then sending a request 
message with session cancellation or communication reset [104]. 
 Any service that has the ability to send or receive data packets is vulnerable to 
flooding DoS attacks, e.g. DoS on wireless sensor networks (WSN) [21]. 
2.5.2 Previous Literature about DoS 
There are different protocols on which to launch a flooding DoS attack; one of the well-
known attacks is the TCP SYN flood attack [14], [119], and [128]. This is when an attacker 
floods a victim with TCP SYN packets, and the victim gets busy in responding to each 
packet with SYN-ACK packets, but the attacker will not complete the three way hand 
shake, by not sending back the ACK packets. A lot of work has been done on this issue; 
initial work on this issue was done by [42] and [130]. 
A detailed analysis of the SYN flooding attack and a discussion of the existing and proposed 
countermeasures was made in [14]. They designed a solution called “SynKill”; it is based 
on the philosophy that this active anomaly detection tool can detect the conditions of a SYN 
flooding attack and react appropriately to defeat, or at least lessen the impact of, an attack. 
It does not require any special hardware or operating systems, network stacks, or even 
modifications in the protected end systems. In [130], the Usage Parameter Control (UPC) 
mechanisms, adopted in Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) networks, are applied to 
prevent the network server from a SYN flooding attack. The basic idea of the proposed 
scheme is to consider the server being congested during a SYN flooding attack, and the 
UPC is used as a traffic control mechanism to regulate a great number of arriving SYN 
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packets so that the server can be prevented from denials of services (DoS). Both the sliding 
window and leaky bucket mechanisms are studied to examine the defence’s effectiveness. 
Parameters of the sliding window and leaky bucket are determined according to the abort 
time, buffer status of the server, and the predicted packet arrival rate. This method provides 
an alternative concept on security management of network servers. The experimental 
results also show that the proposed method can effectively prevent the server from a SYN 
flooding attack. A good survey is in [65]: A Comparison of SYN Flood Detection 
Algorithms. 
Another well-known attack is an ICMP attack, where an attacker floods the victims with 
ICMP requests, i.e. ping messages so the victim gets busy in responding to these requests. 
The attacker amplifies the attack by launching a Distributed DoS (DDoS) that involves 
many attackers, or an attacker can send IP spoofed (victim’s IP) requests to many systems, 
then these systems start to respond to the spoofed address, so the victim is flooded. Such 
attack is called a Smurf attack, or a Distributed Reflected Denial of Service (DRDoS) 
attack. The work in [12] presents a trace-back approach for the reflective ICMP messaging 
DoS attacks. 
Work is presented in [123] in detecting flood-based DoS attacks through polling of Remote 
Monitoring (RMON) capable devices, such as switches and routers. RMON is a special 
purpose Management Information Base designed for the Simple Network Management 
Protocol (SNMP), which tracks low-level network usage indicators, such as byte and packet 
count, packet size, and packet transmission error events. They developed two models to 
distinguish the attack flow from the normal flow: a machine learning model, and a statistical 
model. Through simulations, the machine learning model achieved a detection rate of 
98.6%, and a false alarm rate of 1.4%, while the statistical model resulted in a detection 
rate of 93.1% and a false alarm rate of 6.9%. They validated their simulated machine 
learning model by emulating the network traffic using a live network test bed; it achieved 
a 96.2% detection rate with a 3.8% false alarm rate. 
Jelena Morvic et al. [57] wrote a book about DoS; it is the first of its type to present DoS 
in a published book. It included a definition of DoS, techniques to tackle it, in addition to 
some research about that area. Jelena Morvic and P. Reiher proposed a new defence 
mechanism against DDoS in [50]. The mechanism is called DDoS Network Attack 
Recognition and Defence (D-WARD), a source-end DDoS defence system that achieves 
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autonomous attack detection and accurate response. D-WARD is installed at the source 
network’s router as a gateway to the rest of the Internet. It consists of observation, rate-
limiting, and traffic policing components. At the Observation, the D-WARD finds the 
anomalies in the monitored connections, mainly the (1) Nonresponsive foreign host: 
aggressive sending rate coupled with low response rate, and (2) Spoofed IP. In the first 
case, D-WARD finds the persistent aggressive sending rate coupled with a low response 
rate: this indicates a high flooding attack with no ability to respond, and this technique 
applies only in the case of two-way communications that has a request/response flow, or 
acknowledged communications, like TCP and ICMP. However, any one-way flow cannot 
be observed, such as UDP flood attacks. On the other anomaly, the outgoing packets that 
do not carry local addresses are discarded, at all times, and when a foreign destination 
receives a large number of packets from a local source it is suspected as an attacker. This 
could be beneficial for one-way communications, such as UDP, but is still inaccurate. It is 
possible and common to have some UDP multimedia streaming, or having a “flash crowd” 
for some destination, a large surge in traffic to a particular Web site causing a dramatic 
increase in server load and putting severe strain on the network links leading to the server, 
which results in considerable increase in packet loss and congestion [54]. The flash crowd 
or the Slashdot effect was investigated by several researchers, as in [39], [74], [126], and 
[75]. The second component in [50], which is the rate-limiting, is a response when an attack 
has been detected, by limiting all outgoing traffic to the victim, allowing faster recovery 
from any false alarms. This response would perform well with connection oriented systems, 
i.e. TCP, where mechanisms such as Random Early Detection [99] are employed for 
congestion avoidance. However, it is impossible to employ the previously mentioned 
second component techniques in connectionless cases, such as UDP flooding. The traffic-
policing component receives information from the rate-limiting component, to build 
classification and decisions on each on-going packet. 
2.5.3 SIP security and DoS 
From [45], the very openness and ubiquity that make IP networks such powerful 
infrastructures also make them a liability. Risks include Denial of Service (DoS), Service 
Theft, Unauthorised Call Monitoring, Call Routing Manipulation, and Identity Theft and 
Impersonation, among others. Not only does VoIP inherit all data security risks, it also 
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introduces new vehicles for threats related to the plethora of new emerging VoIP protocols 
that have yet to undergo detailed security analysis and scrutiny. 
There is relatively little research on analysis of behaviour characteristics of SIP traffic in 
[45], the critical control flow of VoIP services, to help design effective problem diagnosis 
tools and attack detection mechanisms. 
The goal of a Denial of Service attack is to render the service or system inoperable; hence 
an attack can be directed toward different entities in the network, depending on the 
attacker’s intent. If the aim is to render the service as a whole inoperable, the main target 
will be the core servers in the SIP infrastructure, such as SIP proxies, but also other servers 
which are necessary in a SIP infrastructure: like DNS, RTP proxies, gateways to other 
networks. Direct attacks on the user agent are also possible; however, they will have a lesser 
impact. The survey in [36] classifies three different types of SIP: 
1. SIP message payload tampering. 
2. SIP message flow tampering. 
3. SIP message flooding. 
SIP message payload tampering: SIP is a text-based protocol and messages are transported 
usually in clear text. This class of attack is based on tampering with the actual SIP message 
or, more specifically, the SIP payload. Attackers can try to inject harmful content into a 
message, e.g. by entering meaningless or wrong information with the goal of exploiting a 
buffer overflow at the target. Also, such messages can be used to probe for vulnerabilities 
in the target. Harmful code that will be executed in an unforeseen context can be introduced 
into the payload, e.g. SQL injection. 
SIP message flow tampering: DoS attacks in real-time communication, in order to disturb 
the on-going communication between users. SIP real-time communication networks 
involve communicating parties to establish a constant connection with each other whereby 
content is transmitted continuously between these parties. An attacker can now target this 
connection by introducing fake signalling messages into the communication channel. 
Several different SIP signalling messages can be misused for this task. A BYE message 
with the right credentials can prematurely terminate a session. An injected CANCEL 
request can prohibit even the establishment of the request. Using an INVITE message, an 
attacker can renegotiate session parameters and redirect on-going sessions. An attacker 
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needs to know the session parameters for these attacks to succeed. He can sniff them from 
the network. These attacks are targeted at SIP UAs only. 
2.5.3.1 SIP message flooding 
Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) operation depends on many entities and agents in order to 
establish a connection, so there would be many possible victims for a DoS flooding attack, 
mainly SIP Servers and User Agents. A flooding attack can consume a victim’s Network 
Bandwidth by simply flooding a SIP network, or a single SIP system such a SIP proxy or 
a SIP Agent at a much higher rate above what can be handled by their network interfaces; 
this is simply a DoS attack that is similar to other possible DoS attacks on different kinds 
of victims and networks.  
It is conventional that any SIP message needs to be processed by any SIP receiver’s system 
in order to complete any SIP procedure, especially as SIP is a text-based protocol, so the 
header needs some interpretation and text parsing before looking into the contained 
parameters. An attacker can launch an attack by flooding a large number of SIP messages 
appended with overhead operations; for example, a comparatively complex SIP 
authentication. This simply would cause the Central Processing Unit (CPU) of a victim to 
get busy for a while, especially when an operation requires an input value to continue, while 
the attacker will not send anything causing the victim utilising the CPU for the whole time. 
To illustrate an example about flooding a SIP victim, Figure 2-5 shows how a malicious 
user can send a flood towards either a SIP proxy server or a SIP phone (user B) or even 
both; this leads to some user like (user A) trying to send a request to the server, the server 
will not process it, this means (user A) will not receive a response from the server, in other 
words, the service the proxy offers is denied. 
A mutual authentication mechanism was proposed in [109], to help in reducing DoS (Denial 
of Service) attacks, detecting server identity spoofing and ensuring basic mutual 
authentication with comparison to HTTP digest, but it is implemented by default within all 
SIP environments. The mechanism consists of providing meaning and semantics to some 
of the parameters' values generated by the participating end-points during SIP session 
establishment, especially to the “nonce” values, which is an arbitrary number or the current 
time on a certain machine or a combination of the two, which is used only once in a 
cryptographic communication [110]. 
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Figure 2-5: SIP flooding DoS example 
A. Keromytis [9] presents a comprehensive survey of VoIP security: analysis of VoIP/IMS 
disclosed vulnerabilities, classification, and recommendations for securing VoIP Systems. 
In an analysis of security implications in Session Initiation Protocol in [7], they have 
explored the plausibility of an attacker exploiting one of the most popular and commonly 
used VoIP - SIP. They identified and described security issues significant to the SIP 
protocol that may lead to DoS, flooding attacks, attacks exploiting vulnerabilities at the 
application layer, and Spam over Internet Telephony (SPIT). They explored the various 
security issues pertinent to the SIP protocol in diverse ways in which a VoIP system 
leveraging SIP can be attacked.  
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An IPsec secured SIP-based VoIP network model implemented on an OPNET Modeller 
simulation was examined in [76]. This paper describes that the research has been carried 
out into examining the options for securing VoIP networks and, more specifically, the 
impact which implementing such security architectures and protocols will have on the 
performance of such secure networks, which has been fulfilled into the development of a 
realistic model for running simulations of the performance of secure session initiation 
protocol-based VoIP networks. The performance analysis of a secure SIP–VoIP network, 
aided by this tool, has been presented along with results obtained for various IPsec 
configurations. The most predominant and alarming effect on VoIP network performance 
was seen in the case where dynamic public key exchange mechanisms, such as IKE, was 
used for establishing shared and authenticated secret keys. The other performance 
bottleneck observed was the shared encryption engine at edge routers and VoIP–PSTN 
gateways, which could very well be averted by using multiple encryption engines. As a 
security option for VoIP, the IPsec framework offers a myriad of choices and options for 
providing security services. Performance analysis of the different configurations of IPSec 
for VoIP networks, using simulation models is a prudent method on which to base 
decisions, when implementing real IPsec secured VoIP networks. 
A two-layer architecture was proposed in [105] to prevent Denial of Service attacks on 
VoIP systems based on the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP). The architecture is designed 
to handle different types of attack including message flooding, malformed message usage, 
and crafted DNS requests. The effectiveness of the prevention mechanisms has been tested 
both in the laboratory and on a real live VoIP provider network. For the flooding problem 
they have installed an Intrusion Detection System based on the Snort IDS [69] which they 
have extended for VoIP awareness. The Snort IDS system was configured with a set of 
newly developed rules for detection of flooding attacks on SIP infrastructures, where 
detection is based mainly on packet payload inspection. The text-based nature of SIP 
messages offers the opportunity for message tampering attacks; to detect any malicious 
messages, they proposed a signature-based detection method on the SIP grammar as 
defined in its RFC3261 [53]. To block a DNS system, an unresolvable request can be sent, 
no answer can be provided until a timeout occurs at the DNS system. The proxy might be 
blocked until the answer from the DNS arrives, the SIP server can be blocked for up to 5 
seconds through one simple message. They suggest a DNS cache that answers to DNS 
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resolve requests from the SIP proxy. It saves the results of the latest DNS queries, but the 
cache still need updates and replacement of the old or expired entries. 
An Intrusion Detection System was designed in [107] for detecting Denial of Service 
Flooding Attacks on Session Initiation Protocol (SIP). The attack detection is through the 
gathering of statistical data; measurements are applied on three different levels or scopes: 
Transaction Level, operation within each single transaction; Sender Level, evaluate all the 
transactions that are from the same IP address; and the Global Level, to summarise all 
recent ongoing transactions, to give feedback on the current system state. Attack mitigation, 
detected due to measurements at the transaction or sender level, is done upon the level so 
the offending source can be identified with the transaction ID, i.e. IP address. So an action 
is taken against the source, like applying a firewall rule to prevent any incoming packets 
from that IP. At the Global level, the detection will be useful in case a Distributed DoS 
(DDoS) is happening, so it is not possible to directly distinguish between malicious and 
regular users at the global level; the possible mitigation strategy would then be to rate-limit 
all incoming traffic. 
A SIP state-machine specification was proposed in [27] to detect multiple-source message 
flooding attacks, by modifying the original Finite State Machine for SIP transactions. This 
detection mechanism can be placed on an external IDS at the network ingress point. The 
author models the four defined transaction state machines specified in the SIP RFC 
(INVITE and non-INVITE transaction state machine, both for the client and server part). 
The transaction anomalies can be detected in a state-full manner for each transaction; the 
according state machine is updated whenever a new SIP message is encountered. For 
flooding detection the author added an error state to each state machine and defines how 
this error state can be reached. An attack is indicated if the number of error states in one 
sampling interval surpasses a threshold. The threshold for attack detection is network 
dependent.  
A SIP aware DoS attack detection that monitors and analyses SIP signalling flow traffic 
was proposed in [24]. It calculates the normal incoming packets ratio, and then it performs 
a pattern analysis to the suspicious SIP flow to determine and detect the abnormal flow 
pattern.  
The work in [34] evaluated different possibilities to mitigate effective Denial of Service 
attacks on SIP servers by flooding the server with requests addressed with irresolvable 
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domain names. They show that over-provisioning is not sufficient to handle such attacks. 
As a more effective approach, they presented a solution called the DNS Attack Detection 
and Prevention (DADP) scheme based on the usage of a non-blocking DNS cache. Based 
on various measurements conducted over the Internet they investigate the efficiency of the 
DADP scheme and compare its performance with different caching strategies applied. 
A specification-based detection framework was presented in [103], to recognise that 
deviation flood Denial-of-Service attacks are a real threat for a SIP-based infrastructure 
from its expected behaviour. They have presented an implementation and have shown with 
measurements that this method is capable of attack detection and mitigation for different 
kinds of attacks directed towards a SIP infrastructure, including Denial of Service message 
flooding. 
A scheme to increase IDS firewall performance was proposed in [106]: performance 
enhancement is done by merging several similar rules into more general ones and ignoring 
lesser relevant rules to limit the number of firewall rules, this scheme fits more in detection 
of flooding attacks. Instead of trying to prevent and deny every uncommon message, a 
small number is accepted, and so ensuring the on-going operation of the service. 
Performance of the calculation can also be increased by iteratively calculating the new 
optimised rule set, instead of a complete recalculation each time new rules are inserted. 
2.5.4 HTTP and SPDY Security and DoS 
A Client-Transparent Approach to Defend against Denial of Service Attacks proposes a 
light-weight client transparent technique to defend against DoS attacks using JavaScript 
support [71]; their experiments have shown that the approach incurs a low performance 
overhead and is resilient to DoS attacks. 
A semi-Markov model was proposed as a monitoring application for DoS [115], with the 
use of a group testing approach anomaly detector helping to describe the dynamics of an 
access matrix and to detect the attacks. The focus of this work lies in the detection 
algorithms proposed and the corresponding theoretical complexity analysis. In addition, 
they provided preliminary simulation results regarding the efficiency and practicability of 
this new scheme. Further discussions over implementation issues and performance 
enhancements are also appended to show its potential. 
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HTTP-GET flood detection techniques were proposed in [111], based on analysis of page 
access behaviour. They proposed two detection algorithms: one focuses on a browsing 
order of pages and the other focuses on a correlation with browsing time to page 
information size. The implemented detection system evaluated a false positive and a false 
negative by using the access log of the Internet web server. As a result, the first algorithm 
can suppress the miss-detection of normal clients, but it has low attack detection accuracy, 
therefore, the first algorithm is effective when prioritising service for normal clients. 
However, the second algorithm has higher attack detection accuracy, but it might reject 
some normal clients. Therefore, the second algorithm is more suitable when giving top 
priority to detection of the HTTP-GET flood attack. 
A selective DoS (S-DoS) prevention approach by [85], by extending the well-known mirror 
sites idea by redirecting different access requests from the same user to different mirror 
sites. They developed an HTTP parser that fragments the HTTP requests for 
communication between the client and server. The random assignment of the requests to 
different mirror sites ensures that the attacker cannot succeed by capturing requests for a 
single Web server and the high degree of unpredictability in mirror selection makes it 
computationally and resource intensive for an attacker to predict the next chosen mirror 
site. 
A novel flow-based statistical aggregation scheme (FSAS) for network anomaly detection 
was presented in [101]. An IP flow is a unidirectional series of IP packets of a given 
protocol, travelling between a source and destination, within a certain period of time. Their 
technique dramatically reduces the amount of monitoring data and handles high amounts 
of statistics and packet data. The FSAS sets up flow-based statistical feature vectors and 
reports to a Neural Network Classifier. The Neural Classifier uses Back-Propagation 
networks to classify the score metric of each flow. FSAS can detect both bandwidth-type 
DoS and protocol-type DoS. 
A system was proposed in [44] which leverages their technique to differentiate web-access 
requests generated by Denial of Service (DoS) attacks from legitimate ones. A port 
randomised VPN architecture was proposed in [132] such that any application can use the 
VPN. The VPN has strength against DoS or DDoS attack. The proposed VPN uses the same 
Java applet as existing SSL VPNs use. A mobile code is called and dynamically changed 
by Java remote method invocation (RMI). The VPN client applet can cooperate with a VPN 
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server and a firewall in the server side. Such a system seems to have its implementation 
distributed over several locations on the internet cloud. 
An improved method for detection and elimination of the security problems is setting up 
the IDS system for timely notification of malicious actions on the network [47]. The 
concept of a firewall and IDS system was used in this paper as a joint mechanism for 
improved VPN network security. The proposed security system consists of firewall, syslog 
server and email server and is implemented in a real environment and tested against some 
frequent DoS attacks. The easiest attacks were realised through the frequent (FTP, HTTP, 
RDP) open ports to the VPN network and successfully detected. Malicious activity system 
alert is a mechanism for starting an active response to IDS attack and for blocking the 
attacker, as well as establishing the full functionality of the network. An access log 
generator to generate access logs was proposed in [17] with characteristics of browsing 
behaviours for the particular Web site under investigation. They also included malicious 
behaviours into the generated access log, which is combined with actual access log of the 
Web site for further tests and analyses. 
A survey by Suga in [124] about SSL/TLS Status in Japan: as the SSL/TLS are used 
together with application layer communication protocols such as HTTP, SMTP, and POP, 
it seems that this vulnerability affects a large number of applications and systems. This 
vulnerability can be attributed to a problem in the SSL and TLS protocol specifications 
themselves. They noted that 40.7% of local governments are vulnerable against the DOS 
attack using the SSL/TLS renegotiation vulnerability and 36.9% sites use 1024 bit or less 
RSA keys. 
There is not much test work of the SPDY, especially security, and no research has ever 
been done yet about Denial of Service attacks on SPDY, focusing on its interaction 
property, as for any Internet service. A very recent RFC has been posted about the Transport 
Layer Security (TLS) and the Application Layer Protocol Negotiation Extension [95]. The 
protocol negotiation within the TLS handshake, for instances in which multiple application 
protocols are supported on the same TCP or UDP port, such an extension allows the 
application layer to negotiate which protocol will be used within the TLS connection. 
Research on web protocols in [6] is about the implementation of e-commerce web site 
security, as web transfer protocol is developed from the first plain HTTP to HTTPS, and 
the developing SPDY, so it is widely used in e-commerce web site transfer protocol. They 
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analysed these network protocols, the author tried Apache Server [113] with SSL/TSL 
support, and they presented prospects of the future development of web security protocol. 
As DoS can target the web and HTTP, such a protocol is vulnerable for a flooding attack. 
Researchers in [25] and in [2] wrote about an HX-DoS attack which is a combination of 
HTTP and XML messages that are intentionally sent to flood and destroy the 
communication channel of the cloud service provider; Cyber-Physical Systems, Software 
as a Service (SaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS). 
From [10] Service optimization proxy: In this case, all web traffic (or much of it) is 
redirected through an intermediate proxy that implements techniques to accelerate web 
page delivery. The appeal of this approach is that improvements to web page delivery time 
may be realised before the end-to-end protocol has been deployed on all web servers. 
However, forcing all traffic through proprietary proxy implementations can have 
unintended consequences when the proxy sends all traffic inside a single opaque tunnel. 
This is equally true if the proxy is based on SPDY, HTTP/2.0, or a completely different 
protocol. Split browsers: SPDY proxies deployed by Google/Amazon as an extension of 
the browser are also proxies. 
It has been found in this PhD thesis that SPDY traffic behaviour makes a SPDY proxy 
vulnerable to a flood DoS, a malicious user who may perform as an attacker has the ability 
to send a single TCP stream to the SPDY proxy that requires a massive number of resources 
or objects to be retrieved from different locations in the Internet. In order to amplify the 
DoS attack, and without involving many attackers to perform a DDoS, an attacker can send 
many TCP streams, each stream containing large number of object requests, and easily 
make a proxy get flooded with web objects that need to be processed over a long period of 
time, so the offered proxy services become unviable unless a certain action is taken to 
detect, react, and recover from the flooding DoS attack. 
 OPNET Simulation Package  
This project consists of many problems that need to be solved and tested experimentally, 
as any offered solution to any research issue should not be kept in its theoretical 
architecture, it has to be validated in testing scenarios to get the appropriate results to make 
that solution proven. For example, Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) runs over all the 
Internet, and the Internet clouds have a countless number of interconnected computing 
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systems. Validating any kind of SIP issue in reality would be impossible, so the best way 
is to implement a solution in an experimental lab, over a real network, by constructing a 
real network system. Such a methodology still has some issues; difficulty in 
implementation due to the needed resources, such resources are the required routers, 
switches, capable servers, many computers, network cables, these resources need a high 
financial budget. Further, this method does not involve only implementing and installing 
the system, but also this methodology may involve installing other dependant hardware 
devices and configuring their software. All of these could simply add extra time spent in 
the configuration, in addition to the added cost of the hardware, software packages and their 
licence fees, and working hours of specialist technicians who do the work of configuration 
a researcher cannot do. 
In addition, many solutions need a large number of computing devices to be installed over 
large distances, which makes any real implementation impossible to validate any system. 
To override such problems, special computer software packages are designed to do the 
previously mentioned tasks; these packages are called Network Simulators, such as NS3 
[81], OmNet++ [82], and ONE simulator [114]. Simulators usually allow any researcher or 
network engineer to design and verify a networking system, and allow assessing the desired 
performance. 
OPNET is one of the most famous and most reliable simulators [83]. All because it is a 
licence-based package, despite it is an open source code, unlike other open source 
simulation packages, OPNET has to check on all the main contributions submitted to it, 
this confirms its reliability to get correct results of the simulation. OPNET supports most 
of the internet and networking protocols, including SIP networks. There are many tool 
boxes in OPNET which can be used for designing different types of network and different 
physical infrastructures. 
In the Project Editor, a user can create nodes and the process models, build packet formats, 
and create filters and parameters, via more specialised editors described later in this section. 
Generally, each network consists of objects and nodes; the Node Editor is used to define 
the behaviour of each network object, the behaviour is defined by different modules, which 
define the node internal behaviour, such as CPU, storage...etc., and those modules are 
connected via packet streams or statistic wires. An object consists of multiple modules and 
they define the object’s behaviour. The Process Model Editor controls the functionality of 
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the node; it mainly presents the process in Finite State Machines (FSM), the FSMs consist 
of States and Transitions. The Link Model Editor creates new types of link objects, each 
having different attributes. The Path Editor is used to create new path objects and to define 
a traffic route. The Demand Editor is used to define demand models; each demand object 
determines its attribute interfaces, presentation, and behaviour. After all, the network model 
has to be created; now one of the main stages is to define the statistics needed to be collected 
during the simulation, this could be done in the project editor, but if additional 
characteristics were desired, the Probe Editor allows that. Lastly, once getting the 
simulation stage, it can be run from the Project Editor, but if more constraints are required 
within the simulation, the Simulation Sequence Editor allows more configurations. 
Simulation sequences are represented by simulation icons, which contain a set of attributes. 
For the wireless functionality, the Antenna Pattern Editor models are the direction 
dependent gain properties of antennas. The Filter Editor enables data filter building; there 
are even built-in filters in OPNET. The Interface Control Information Editor (ICI) is used 
to define the internal structure of ICIs that are used to formalise interrupt-based inter-
process communication. 
In addition, a Modulation Curve Editor can be used to modulate the vulnerability of 
information coding and modulation scheme to noise. The Packet Format Editor defines the 
internal structure of a packet as a set of fields. To analyse the spread of probability over a 
range of possible outcomes, the Probability Density Function (PDF) Editor enables that. 
The main two tool boxes used were the Internet toolbox and the SIP tool box. They were 
mainly used to build the networks; the primary tools used were the SIP Proxy Servers, IP 
Telephones as end users, routers, switches, hubs, and links such as 10baseT, 100BaseT, 
Point to Point Protocol (PPP links). The Application Configuration Object was used to 
configure the VoIP applications, and the Profile Configuration Object was used to 
configure the behaviour of every IP phone end user, both the caller, as a normal caller or 
an attacker, and the callee, as normal receiver or a victim. 
For the current issue of Flooding Denial of Service against SIP, the implementation of any 
problem and its solution on OPNET will involve many steps: design the network, define 
the parameters, choose the suitable statistics, run the simulation for a specific time, show 
the result, and finally discuss and analyse the observed results. 
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The network was defined by defining its model, size, and elements. SIP Elements were set 
by how many end VoIP phone clients, or more precisely the User Agent Clients (UAC) 
were needed, what kind of servers were required (Proxy, Redirect, or Registrar server), and 
the number of servers were set, or in other words the User Agent Server (UAS). Further 
network elements were the needed interconnecting devices, routers and switches, and how 
many ports each device has. In addition, to define what the transmission media and cables 
were used: different kinds of twisted pairs between the switches and the clients, like 
10BaseT, 100BaseT and 1000BaseT cables, while the Point to Point Protocol (PPP) was 
defined to link between the routers, and to specify the data rate and the length for some of 
these links. 
 
 
Figure 2-6: OPNET simulation package main screen 
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The defined applications were real-time multimedia network-based applications, where the 
multimedia streaming session must be initialled by the SIP protocol, these applications are 
located on the servers. Here in the current experiments, the defined applications were VoIP 
applications. Once a client wishes to start a VoIP call, requests are sent to the local SIP 
Proxy Servers. 
For some clients that were defined to behave as attackers, the defined applications for them 
were set to operate in an abnormal mode, such as sending too many requests during the 
simulation time, which can even prevent other normal clients starting at least one SIP-VoIP 
call during the simulation running time. Every callee should define at least one application 
as a supported service. 
A profile is used to describe how to use the predefined VoIP applications and how they 
behave within the simulation running time, like the start time, the number of repetitions 
within the simulation… etc., so each profile should be attached with at least one application. 
Every VoIP client (UAC) wishing to initiate a call should have at least one profile. 
OPNET offers statistical data gathering in order to choose the type of statistics to be 
collected during the simulation run, depending on the need of the research of the network. 
For the current project, the statistics needed are mainly those related to the multimedia 
transmission, like SIP UAC, SIP UAS, Voice Applications or others. In every main statistic, 
there are sub-statistics, like the number of calls requested, or the number of calls connected 
or rejected, which show the effect of any DoS attack. Other statistics could be needed for 
some analysis related to the problem, like CPU usage and utilization, memory usage, 
network bandwidth represented by Ethernet load, link utilization. 
Finally, run the simulation: many parameters should be checked and modified before 
running, in order to run the simulator to get the ultimate desired results. Like the time the 
simulation runs, the number of results to be collected, in addition to other data that are not 
related to the experiment itself, but they are related to the OPNET package itself, like 
forcing recompilation during the run. 
Chapter 2 
 
36 
 Summary 
This chapter has presented an introduction about the computer science areas this research 
is related to, the Internet generally and its applications, the Computer Networks with the 
related Security principles, and a focus on the Denial of service flooding attack. This 
chapter also presented the application layer protocols and their security: Hyper Text 
Transport Protocol (HTTP) with SPDY technology, and Session Initiation Protocol (SIP). 
The security issue Flooding Denial of Service (DoS) attacks with a focus on the issue of 
DoS attacks targeting SIP and SPDY was explored, and how it can be done on both 
protocols and their entities; an attacker can anticipate these protocols flow behaviour to 
launch a flood towards any victim. The related previous literature was reviewed and 
summarised to illustrate how others dealt with the problem. 
Finally, the OPNET simulation package was introduced as it played an important role to 
simulate the effect of DoS attacks on SIP. 
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 Quality Control: Statistical Process Charts 
(SPC) 
D. C. Montgomery in his book [19] defined Statistical Process Control (SPC): to monitor 
and control a Quality within some process. Since characteristics within a certain system are 
not always identical from unit to unit, this generates a norm average among all the units for 
a reasonable quality. The Control Chart is one of the primary techniques used in SPC. 
Control charts are a very useful process monitoring technique; when unusual sources of 
variability are present, especially from uncontrollable sources of variability, or from 
difficult to control inputs, sample averages will plot outside the control limits, providing a 
signal that some investigation of the process should be made and corrective action to 
remove these unusual sources of variability should be applied to the input and output 
variable(s) in a system. Generally they plot the averages, or other statistical equations and 
techniques that utilise the averages of measurements of quality characteristics, of the 
samples which were taken from the process, versus time period units or the ordered sample 
numbers. 
For each experiment and whenever an SPC equation is applied, for both SIP and SPDY, 
the input observation values of the charts vary for each tested protocol. The input 
observation value per time unit ( i ) is notated as ( X 
i 
). An input observation value for the 
SIP experimental simulation was the ratio of the number of the responses which were not 
sent (non-acknowledged requests), to the total number of the received requests per time 
period (time unit). Assuming: 
α
 i
  : is the total number of SIP requests per time unit ( i ) 
β
 i
  : is the total number of SIP responses per time unit ( i ) 
Δ
 i
  : is the difference between α 
i
 and β
 i
 , Δ
 i
 = α 
i
  – β
 i 
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Then the ratio or the input observation value for SIP ( SIP_X  
i
 ) is computed by: 
 
SIP_X  
i
   = Δ
 i
 / α 
i
 
(3.1)  
An input observation value for SPDY experimental simulation was the result of 
multiplication of the number of TCP streams sent by a user to a SPDY proxy server, by the 
average number of the resources requested per each TCP stream per time unit ( i ) . 
Assuming that: 
α
 i
  : is the total number of TCP streams sent by a user per time unit ( i ) 
β
 i
  : is the average of the number of the resources requested per each TCP stream per   
time unit ( i )  
 
Then the input observation value for SPDY ( SPDY_X  
i
   ) is computed by: 
 
SPDY_X  
i
   = α 
i
 . β
 i
 
(3.2)  
The difference in the observation input is to show that the techniques that are used in the 
research are flexible in different cases. Because the scenario of SIP traffic flow is a two-
way communication, and an input value for the SIP experimental simulation is a ratio, 
which is a mathematical division operation as shown in equation (3.1), then (SIP_X  
i
 ) will 
result in tiny input values. While the scenario of SPDY traffic flow is a one-way 
communication, and an input value for the SPDY experimental simulation is a 
multiplication operation as shown in equation (3.2), then (SPDY_X  
i
  ) will result in very 
large input values. 
 Cumulative Summation (CUSUM) 
Cumulative Summation (CUSUM) [19], [26], [41], and [56], is a sequential statistical 
analysis technique, which is used to monitor and to detect changes within any sequence of 
quantitative observations in some experiment, i.e. monitoring for any sudden increase or 
decrease in the number of incoming messages. CUSUM is a recursive equation, which 
means a new CUSUM value is dependent on the previous CUSUM values. After a new 
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input value to the sequence of the observations is obtained, it will be used to find a new 
CUSUM value. CUSUM is computed according to the following equation: 
 C 
i
 = X  
i
 - (  µ 
0 
+ K + σ ) + C 
 i – 1 
  
 
(3.3)  
The tabular form of CUSUM is another form of CUSUM where it is a one-sided upper 
CUSUM. In this approach, CUSUM is only assigned positive values. At any point where 
the CUSUM equation gets a negative value, CUSUM is assigned to zero, as mentioned in 
[19]. This allows an easier plot as the graph will be always plotted on the positive area of 
the y-axis, or visually over the x-axis. The results in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 will show 
more analysis and details. The equation below is the one-sided upper CUSUM. 
 C
i
+
 = MAX [ 0 , ( X i 
- (  µ 
0
 + K + σ ) + C  
i – 1  
] 
 
(3.4)  
The superscripted plus sign ( + ) on the right top corner of (C + ) indicates the positive plot 
always over the x-axis, within the positive y-axis area. This scales the CUSUM graph in 
order to show a clearer and easier way to detect a DoS attack by the threshold limits, as will 
be shown later in this thesis. Where: 
C 
i
  : most recent CUSUM value to be computed  
C
i
+
  : most recent upper sided CUSUM value to be computed 
C
 i – 1 
 : previous CUSUM value 
C
i
+
- 1 
 : previous upper sided CUSUM value 
X 
i
  : most recent observation value 
µ 
0
  : the Overall observations’ mean value 
 
The variable ( K ) is called the reference value or the allowance, and it is often chosen about 
halfway between the target ( µ 
i – 1 
) and the out of control value of the mean ( µ 
i
). K is 
calculated by:  
 
 
 
 
K = 
δ . σ
2
 
(3.5) 
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If the shift was expressed by the standard deviation units, then K is one-half the magnitude 
of the shift and it is given by: 
As CUSUM computes the differences between the values and the average, it is able to 
detect and plot small changes in a sequence of quantitative observations, so it can be 
employed in very critical and sensitive DoS protection systems, because it will make it 
easier to detect any sudden change, even it is a small change, in the incoming traffic. 
3.1.1 CUSUM Control Limits  
There have been several attempts to work out the optimal level of each threshold, but the 
simplest, lowest complexity, and the best performing, is to use a function of the standard 
deviation ( σ ) of the whole sequence, as the authors suggest in [19]. In the current research, 
an alarm threshold equal to five times the standard deviation is represented as big theta (Θ). 
 Θ = 5 . σ (3.8)  
 
Using the standard deviation, a threshold limit was used to sense any increase in the 
CUSUM due to an increase in the ratio. This is useful to alert the victim of a possible 
upcoming attack, or to detect any slow rate DoS attack, without or just before trigging the 
attack alarm. In this research, the attack alarm is represented as small theta ( θ ), which is 
double the value of the standard deviation. 
 Exponentially Weighted Moving Average (EWMA) 
The Exponentially Weighted Moving Average (EWMA) control chart is a good control 
chart when you are interested in detecting small shifts within a sequential quantitative 
observation, Montgomery [19], in addition to other considerable publications [49], [97], 
[96], and [98]. EWMA is taken as a low-pass filter that discards noise in the samples. It 
 
δ = 
| µ 
i 
 −   µ 
i – 1
 |
σ
 
(3.6) 
 
K = 
| µ 
i 
 −   µ 
i – 1
 |
2
 
(3.7) 
 θ = 2 . σ (3.9)  
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depends on a smoothing weight factor that determines how quickly the older values are 
forgotten [5]. Since the EWMA can be viewed as a weighted average of all past and current 
observations, EWMA is a dynamic algorithm that constantly adapts its value based on 
continuous measurements and it is very insensitive to the normality assumption, therefore 
it is an ideal control chart to use with individual observations and is used extensively in 
time series modelling and in forecasting [19], [30], and [77]. The basic EWMA equation is 
defined by equation (3.10): 
 EWMA i =  λ . Xi + (1 - λ ) . EWMA i -1  (3.10)  
Another trend was adapted in this research, similar to the CUSUM algorithm, of finding an 
EWMA value by applying the concept of the upper-sided EWMA algorithm, but the 
decision value is the mean ( μ
0
), where the plot starts, not zero as it was in CUSUM. 
 EWMA i
+ =  MAX [ ( λ . X i+ (1 - λ ) . EWMA i-1
+   ), μ
0
 ] (3.11) 
EWMA i : The most recent EWMA to be computed. 
EWMA i
+
 : The most recent upper-sided EWMA to be computed. 
EWMA i-1: The previous EWMA value. 
EWMA i-1
+
 : The previous upper sided-EWMA value.  
EWMA 0 = μ0 
 μ
0
 : The Overall observations’ mean 
 : A weighting factor, where 0 <  ≤ 1 
 
3.2.1 EWMA Control Limits 
To detect a change in a sequence, lines were set for the quantitative observations of that 
process; a Centre Line (CL) represents where this process characteristic should fall, the 
Upper Control Limits (UCL) and Lower Control Limits (LCL) are determined from 
some simple statistical considerations. Equations (3.12), (3.13), and (3.14) show the limits’ 
equations. 
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UCL = μ
0
 + L . σ . √ 
λ
( 2 - λ )
 . [ 𝟏 −  ( 𝟏 −  𝝀 ) 𝟐 .𝒊 ]    
(3.12)  
 CL = μ
0
 (3.13)  
 
LCL = μ
0
 -  L . σ . √ 
λ
( 2 - λ )
 . [ 𝟏 −  ( 𝟏 −  𝝀 ) 𝟐 .𝒊 ]    
(3.14)  
 μ
0
 : The Overall observations’ mean 
 : A weighting factor, where 0 <  ≤ 1 
𝝈   : The Standard deviation. 
L : The width of the control limits. 
 
Montgomery in [19] strongly recommended the use of the exact control limits in equations  
(3.12) and (3.14) for small values of i. This will greatly improve the performance of the 
control chart in detecting an off-target process immediately after the EWMA starts up [19]. 
EWMA is sometimes called a Geometric Moving Average (GMA), because the weights 
decline geometrically when connected by a smooth curve. 
The weight (  ) is a smoothing factor that controls the how quickly the old values are 
forgotten, so it is measure of the variability in order to capture important patterns and 
discard noise in the sample data. The width of the control limits ( L ) are utilised to set the 
threshold to detect an out of control process or most recent observation. 
EWMA has been used in other disciplines of science and research where the variables ( ) 
and ( L ) have been used in different ways and with different values. Since the EWMA 
chart implementation is sensitive to small shifts in the process, so choosing the previously 
mentioned factors can be a dilemma by itself. Some other researchers have investigated the 
issue of setting these factors with some recommendation, like in [19], [80], [117], and 
[116]. The  recommendation is to assign the smoothing factor to 7/8 ( λ = 7/8 ≈ 0.9 ), and 
the width of the control limits to 3 ( L = 3 ) when used as an attack threshold alarm in 
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equation (3.12), which is notated as upper theta ( Θ ), therefore an alert attention, which is 
notated as lower theta ( θ ), is set to 2 ( L = 2 ). 
 Statistical Process Control and Denial of Service  
A Real-Time Attack Detection and Prevention System for DDoS was designed in [131]. 
The designed research was based on per-IP Traffic Behavioural Analysis. A new 
nonparametric CUSUM algorithm is applied to detect SYN flooding attacks. The system is 
deployed at the entrance to the victim subnet, such as access network. The system 
architecture can be divided into three layers: application layer, network layer, and driver 
layer. 
A mechanism for detecting SYN flooding attacks at leaf routers, which connect end hosts 
to the Internet, was proposed in [42]. The simplicity of the detection mechanism lies in its 
statelessness and low computation overhead, which make the detection mechanism itself 
immune to flooding attacks. The detection mechanism is based on the protocol behaviour 
of TCP SYN-FIN (RST) pairs, and is an instance of the Sequential Change Point Detection. 
To make the detection mechanism insensitive to site and access pattern, a non-parametric 
CUSUM method was applied, making the detection mechanism much more generally 
applicable and its deployment much easier. The efficacy was validated by simulations. The 
results show that the detection mechanism has short detection latency and high detection 
accuracy. Also it was shown how it reveals the location of the flooding sources without 
resorting to expensive IP trace back. 
A simple and robust mechanism in [43] to detect Denial of Service (DoS) attacks, called 
Change Point Monitoring (CPM), was presented. The core is based on the inherent network 
protocol behaviours and is an instance of the Sequential Change Point Detection. The 
CUSUM method was applied. CPM only introduces a few variables to record the protocol 
behaviours. The statelessness and low computation overhead of CPM made it immune to 
any flooding attacks. The efficacy of CPM is evaluated by detecting a SYN flooding attack 
which is the most common DoS attack. The evaluation results show that CPM has short 
detection latency and high detection accuracy. 
The CUSUM statistical method [29] was used in [62] to treat flooding DoS on SIP attacks. 
CUSUM statistical detection founded on the adaptive sliding window based acquisition is 
adopted for achieving high accuracy and low latency. The experimental result shows that 
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this method achieves a high rate, low latency and low false alarm rate of SIP flooding 
detection.  
Although EWMA is a powerful SPC technique to monitor and control quality, it has been 
used less to detect DoS attacks. Low rate Denial of Service was discussed in [58], where 
they used the EWMA algorithm to observe the departure of TCP traffic distribution. When 
the TCP traffic becomes unusual, its distribution and decreased degree are significantly 
different than those without any low rate DoS attack. Experiments in their work had shown 
that EWMA was effective to detect multiple modes of low rate DoS attack. 
An approach to detecting denial of QoS attacks on DiffServ networks was given in [125]. 
They focused on online quick detection, scalability to large networks, and a low false alarm 
generation rate. Sensors sample QoS metric at strategic points and anomalies are detected 
in sampled network flow statistics using a EWMA Control Chart. In addition, rule-based 
intrusion detection is used with these techniques. They tested this intrusion detection 
approach using emulation on a test bed, and using simulation. Their approach resulted in 
100% detection, but it required from under a minute to approximately 15 minutes to detect. 
The false alarm rate at the sensitivity level used to achieve these detection results was less 
than 1%. 
 SPC Ways of Application 
3.4.1 Offline 
This method is applied by finding the mean ( μ 
n
 ) and the standard deviation ( σ 
n
 )  of the 
whole sequence of quantitative observations prior to computing an SPC value. This method 
represents a system with previous knowledge and experience of the ongoing traffic. This 
way of implementation has an advantage of overhead reduction in the time spent in finding 
the mean and the standard deviation every time a new observation is added to the sequence. 
Figure 3-1 shows the flowchart of the offline way of application in DoS detection. The 
entire observation set is read ( X = { X0 , X1, X2 ,…,X n } ), then the mean ( μ 
n
 ) and the 
standard deviation ( 𝝈 
n
 ) of the whole set are found. After that the alert attention limit (θ
n
) 
is found, and if the result of ( SPC 
n
 ) is equal or greater than this limit, then it is compared 
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to ( Θ 
n
), which is the alarm threshold. If the result of ( SPC 
n
 ) is equal to or greater than 
this threshold then a DoS attack alarm is triggered. 
Start
 X = {X0 , X1, X2 ,…,Xn}
μ n ,σ n
θ n Θ n
SPC n ≥ θ n
no
YES
TAKE 
ACTION
YES
no
SPC n ≥ Θ n
alert ALARM
 
Figure 3-1: Flowchart for the Offline detection application 
3.4.2 Online 
This method is applied by updating the mean ( μ 
i
 ) and the standard deviation ( σ 
i
 )  on 
getting a new observation and adding it to the sequence of the quantitative observations 
every single time unit. Then the ( SPC 
i
 ) equation is immediately applied for the current 
whole sequence. This way of application has an advantage for implementation on a system 
with no prior experience or knowledge of the ongoing traffic, such as if a system is newly 
started, or if a system has been reset, for instance, after detecting flooding in the current 
traffic, and it can adapt the SPC to detect any DoS attack. Figure 3-2 shows the flowchart 
of the online way of application in DoS detection. Once a new observation is read ( X 
i
 ) 
and added to the observation set, then the mean ( μ 
i
 ) and the standard deviation ( 𝝈 
i
 ) of 
the whole set are updated. After that the alert attention limit ( θ 
i
 ) is updated. If the result 
of ( SPC 
i
 ) is equal to or greater than this limit, then it is compared to ( Θ 
i
 ), which is the 
alarm threshold. If the result of ( SPC 
i
 ) is equal to or greater than this threshold then a 
DoS attack alarm is triggered. 
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Start
New, current 
observation  X i
μ i ,σ i
θ i Θ i
SPC i ≥ θ i
no
YES
TAKE 
ACTION
YES
no
SPC i ≥ Θ i
alert ALARM
 
Figure 3-2: Flowchart for the Online detection application 
 Summary 
This chapter has explained in detail the Quality Control and the Statistical Process Charts 
(SPC), Cumulative Summation (CUSUM), and Exponentially Weighted Moving Average 
(EWMA). These techniques were the methodology the current research had used to detect 
DoS attacks. For each technique, their related equations were explored, equations for 
monitoring the process and sensing the change in the observations, and other equations for 
setting the thresholds to optimally detect flooding DoS attacks were seen. Finally, two 
different ways of applying the SPC techniques, offline and online, were discussed with flow 
charts illustrating their work and the difference between the two. 
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 DoS Targeting SIP: Results and Analysis 
 DoS impact on SIP: OPNET Simulation 
Some experimental work has been done in order to present the impact of the problem of 
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks towards Session Initiation Protocol (SIP). OPNET 
Simulator [83] was utilised to do the job. 
Several scenarios were designed, many of them failed to show the problem, due to 
different reasons, mainly the difficulty of OPNET itself. This simulator is such a huge 
software package which needs a long time to learn its basics in order to set a proper 
scenario that is able to simulate a certain network flow. However, the scenarios were 
finalised to fully illustrate the issue; the first scenario shows the basic idea of the DoS 
attacks towards a SIP server and a SIP callee (receiver). The second scenario shows the 
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) against a SIP server and a SIP callee, involving too 
many callers which were set to be attackers to simulate multiple sources of a flood. 
4.1.1 Small network simulation 
This scenario simply consists of a SIP caller, SIP callee, attacker, and SIP Server. The 
caller attempts to start a SIP-based VoIP call to the callee. The caller is the User Agent 
Client (UAC), while the callee is the User Agent Server (UAS), as in Figure 4-1. The SIP 
server has the responsibility of connecting the calls between any caller (UAC) and callee 
(UAS). This server was set to a limited simultaneous calls set to 5 calls at a time; this 
plays an important role in presenting how a DoS attack works, as every system has its 
own limitation. 
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Figure 4-1: SIP OPNET small network design 
Two applications were set in this scenario. The first one was called “app_1”, it represents 
the normal operation of a caller attempting to initiate a VoIP session with the callee. It is 
simply an IP telephony application, with SIP signalling, while SIP is running over TCP 
in this scenario. The second application was the malicious one; an IP telephony, with SIP 
signalling, and running over TCP.  
There were no differences between the applications, but the differences were in the 
profiles that defined the attitude of each agent, and how they used the defined applications. 
The first profile supported the normal application, it initiated the call after 120 seconds of 
the simulation start, and the call duration was 360 seconds, and it had no repetitions. There 
were other 10 attacking profiles, each profile started after 60 seconds of the simulation 
starting time, each profile had a call duration of only 5 seconds, but every profile was 
repeatable for unlimited occurrences, with inter-repetition time of 2 seconds between 
every two occurrences. 
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The caller was supported with the normal profile, while the attacker is supported with the 
other 10 attacking profiles, which represents the attacker’s high rate of requests being sent 
to the SIP server, which led the server to get busy in processing these requests. 
Figure 4-2 shows how the server was busy in dealing with the calls’ requests, since the 
starting time of the attacking profile is at the second 60; the line in blue is the active calls, 
the inter-repetition time of each call is 2 second, call durations in red is around 4 seconds, 
which is around the 5 seconds which was set to each attacking profile. So that is why the 
blue line goes up for 4 seconds and down for around 2 seconds. 
Figure 4-3 is about the callee, the same as the server’s results, the callee was busy with 
the active calls, and it is here equal to 1 call for the whole simulation. 
Finally, Figure 4-4 is the attacker’s active calls among the simulation, and the call 
durations. Here it looks the same as in the server’s results, because it is the only active 
caller during the simulation. 
 
Figure 4-2: Small network’s SIP server; Active calls, and Calls durations in seconds 
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Figure 4-3: Small network’s Callee active Calls 
 
 
Figure 4-4: Small network’s Attacker; active calls, and call durations 
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4.1.2 Large network simulation 
This scenario consists of 5 callers, 5 receivers, 100 attackers, and a SIP Server. It shows 
the effect of a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS). The caller, the User Agent Client 
(UAC), attempts to start a SIP-based VoIP call to the callee, which is the User Agent 
Server (UAS).  
Figure 4-5 shows the scenario’s network architecture, the normal callers and receivers 
were framed with yellow; Callers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and Receivers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. The SIP_Server 
and Receiver_5 were the victims and are framed with red in  
Figure 4-5, while Receiver_5 was a normal operating receiver, it was set as a targeted 
victim in the scenario. The 100 attackers were all involved simultaneously during the 
attack, this is to simulate many sources of a flood to form a DDoS attack. 
The SIP server had the responsibility of connecting the calls between any caller (UAC) 
and callee (UAS). This server had a limited ability of the number of simultaneous calls 
that is set to 20 calls at a time; this limitation plays an important role in presenting how 
DoS and DDoS attacks work.  
Five applications were set in this scenario to act as normal running applications; they 
represented the normal behaviour of a caller attempting to initiate a VoIP session with 
some callees. The applications were simply IP telephony applications, with SIP signalling 
running over TCP. Another application was defined as an attacking application, an IP 
telephony, with SIP signalling running over TCP. 
There were no differences between the applications, but the differences are in the profiles 
that defined the attitude of each agent, and how they use the defined applications. The 
first profile initiated the call after 120 seconds of the simulation start, and the call duration 
was 150 seconds, and it had no repetitions. 
The second profile initiated the call after 600 seconds of the simulation starting time, and 
the call duration was 210 seconds, and it had no repetitions. The third profile initiated the 
call after 960 seconds of beginning the simulation, and the call duration was 120 seconds, 
and it had no repetitions. The fourth profile initiated the call after 980 seconds of the 
simulation start, and the call duration was 60 seconds, and it had no repetitions. The fifth 
profile initiated the call after 1200 seconds of the simulation start, and the call duration 
was 150 seconds, and it had no repetitions. 
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The attacker’s profile initiated the call after 500 seconds of the simulation starting time, 
and the VoIP call duration was 2 seconds, the very short call duration was set to simulate 
an attacker attempting to make a call and hang up immediately to start another short call, 
and it had unlimited repetitions. Each normal caller and callee were supported with one 
of the normal profiles, while every attacker of the 100 attackers was supported with the 
attacking profile. After running the simulation for 30 minutes, there had been some results 
gathered. 
 
 
 
Figure 4-5: SIP OPNET large network design 
 
Figure 4-6 is the active calls among the simulation, it shows how successful the first call 
was, before starting the attack; the bulky blue area indicates the continuous active calls. 
As it seems, there was only one successful call during the attack period, while three other 
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calls failed to initiate a session. This gives an indication of how such a DoS attack 
prevented 75% of the users of using the SIP service during the simulation’s attack. 
Figure 4-7 shows the active calls among the simulation which is about the successful 
callers; the first caller that succeeded to start, continue without disruption, and finish a 
VoIP call, before the start of the DoS attack. The fourth caller, which is another successful 
caller, also succeeded to start, continue without disruption and finish a VoIP call, but 
during the time of the DoS attack. 
Figure 4-8 shows how some normal agents were unable to initiate calls; it shows the 
number of rejected calls for callers 2, 3, and 5. They were unable to initiate the call 
because of the attack. Finally, Figure 4-9 is about callee number five, where actually all 
attackers try to call; it shows below how it was busy with the calls for the whole attacking 
period in the simulation. 
 
 
 
Figure 4-6: Large Network’s server active calls 
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Figure 4-7: Large Network’s first and fourth caller active calls 
 
 
Figure 4-8: Large Network’s callers 2,3, and 5; rejected calls 
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Figure 4-9: Large Network’s callee 5; active calls 
4.1.3 Experimental Limitations 
During carrying out the experimental work many limitations were faced that slowed down 
the process and caused latency in getting the final results of the work. OPNET is a huge 
package, and it comes along with too many tools and options, with several parameters that 
must be adjusted depending on the experiment. So it needed a long time in order to go 
through and test many cases and different scenarios in order to handle the required features 
in the OPNET simulator and experience them. There would be a better chance to learn 
more about the OPNET features if more time was spent on it, and by that more 
experiments and scenarios will be done, and better results will be obtained with better 
perfect analysis.  
In addition, many scenarios were not completed successfully, because when these 
scenarios were carried out, they needed to collect too many values and statistics, and they 
seemed to do many processes that were limited by the computer’s processing capability, 
the system’s memory, and the space availability on the hard disk. Furthermore, the 
simulation crashed many times during the run time; the simulator had to be restarted, in 
order to modify the scenarios, and look for the reasons behind the crash. On some 
occasions, the computer had to be reset which led to data loss. 
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 Traffic Generation 
The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) is a two-way communication method, and it is a 
connection oriented data communication, which means any sent request must be 
acknowledged with a response. However, as the internet is a packet switching 
communication network, it is always possible and expected to miss a few responses for 
their correspondent sent requests; so within any time period, there will be always a ratio 
between the total number of NON-acknowledged responses and their sent requests. 
The previous concept is very useful to aid in detecting any sudden Denial of Service (DoS) 
flood towards any SIP targeted victim, when the victim gets busy in processing the 
received traffic, which means less acknowledged responses for every received request, 
and by result, this will increase the ratio of the NON-acknowledged sent responses and 
the received requests. 
Two different sets of traffic were tested in the current research; the first set was generated 
by the simulation methods which were used in the research, the second set of traffic was 
obtained from another research that adopted the same idea of SIP two-way 
communications [45]. The first generated set was tested into two different scenarios 
according to how steep is the increase of the incoming requests, and the differences 
between the incoming requests and the acknowledged responses. The first scenario shows 
the case of a sudden high steep increase in the incoming traffic with much less 
acknowledgments which means a subjectively large difference, and the second scenario 
shows the case of a low sudden steep increase in the incoming traffic with less differences 
in the acknowledgments. The second scenario represents a low and slow flooding DoS 
attack which targets a SIP victim. In each scenario, two cases were tested. The first case 
was by previously finding the mean ( µ ) and the standard deviation ( σ ) of the whole 
sequence of the observed ratios, then finding the CUSUM or EWMA values, and this case 
represents a system which monitors the traffic and having previous knowledge about the 
traffic. The second case in CUSUM or EWMA calculations is by updating the mean and 
the standard deviation right after getting a new observation ratio, and then finding the new 
CUSUM or EWMA values. Both ways of calculations have shown significant results; the 
first case has an advantage of reducing the overhead spent in the computations, while the 
advantage of the second case was to present how a system with no previous experience or 
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knowledge of the ongoing traffic can adapt the CUSUM and EWMA to detect any sudden 
change in that traffic. 
4.2.1 Simulation Generated Data set 
The network architecture in Figure 4-10 for the scenario of generating traffic of SIP 
consists mainly of a SIP agent connected to a Traffic Monitor; in a real-life network this 
would be a firewall, a DeMilitarized Zone (DMZ) [61], or any other malware protection 
software. The SIP Traffic Monitor is connected to the internet cloud, it receives SIP 
requests and forwards them to the SIP agents, and returns the responses to the external 
requesting agents. The SIP Traffic Monitor is in charge of counting the requests and their 
correspondent responses, in order to screen the flow behaviour of SIP for abnormalities, 
and detects any potential flooding DoS attacks that attempt to utilise the behaviour of SIP 
flow. 
 
 
Figure 4-10: SIP scenario network architecture 
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Figure 4-11: SIP First generated scenario simulated traffic, large differences 
The generated traffic was set to run normally starting from the time point zero until right 
before the 100th time unit ( t = [ 0 , 100 ) ), the number of the acknowledged responses is 
equal or so to the number of the received requests, as both the red and the blue lines are 
almost overlapping on each other except for a very few small and unnoticeable differences 
throughout this time period. It is highly expected to have missed messages or out of order 
packets in the normal Internet packet switching world, until at the time unit of 100 ( t = 
100 ) as the DoS attack starts, this is how the simulation parameters were set, so the red 
line looks as shifting down starting from this point until the end of the simulation and the 
end of the DoS attack. 
The plotted graph in Figure 4-11 shows the simulation’s generated traffic of the first 
scenario. The x-axis represents the simulation’s time line ( t ), the y-axis is the number of 
requests (blue), and how many of these requests were acknowledged by a response (red), 
among the x-axis, the time of the simulation run. 
In the second scenario of the first set of the simulated traffic, the increase of the received 
requests slightly increases, it is harder to be noticed if plotted in a chart, meanwhile the 
sent responses also slightly decrease, without dropping too much, in order to simulate a 
slow rate DoS flood. 
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Figure 4-12 illustrates the received requests and their correspondent responses. Around 
time slot 28 and slot 29, ( t = 28 ) and ( t = 29 ), a very slight and unnoticeable difference 
was set in the requests and the responses, the slight increase was set to represent a 
possibility of slow flooding DoS attack. 
The graph which is plotted in Figure 4-13 is a zoom at the time period from 95 until 110, 
( t = [ 95 , 110 ] ). Again the attack was set to start at ( t = 100 ), prior to this point, where 
the normal traffic is flowing on, then it is much clearer how after the 100th time unit and 
during the attack, the fewer responses the victim was able to acknowledge for every 
request received, as the victim’s resources are presented to be sensitive, which means the 
victim was less able to respond to each request on their received time. 
This scenario is an excellent example representing the slow rate flooding DoS attacks, 
which cannot be easily detected, but slowly able to consume certain resources on the 
victim’s side. The graph which is plotted in Figure 4-14 is a zoom at the time period from 
26 until 31, ( t = [ 26 , 31 ] ); this slight increase would happen due to the nature of the 
internet, it is very expected to have delays and differences. However, the methodology 
proved its reliability by spotting these differences after applying the SPC equations, both 
CUSUM and EWMA. 
 
 
 
Figure 4-12: SIP second generated scenario simulated traffic, slight increase 
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Figure 4-13: SIP second generated scenario, zoom at the attack, t=[95,110] 
 
 
Figure 4-14: SIP second generated scenario, zoom at t = [ 26 , 31 ] 
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4.2.2 Imported Traffic 
The graph below in Figure 4-15 plots the imported traffic from [45], or the extended 
version from [46]. The traffic is an analysis of SIP traffic from an operational VoIP 
service, and it is the first attempt at profiling SIP-based VoIP traffic behaviour based on 
real-network traces. The graph shows the number of received SIP REGISTER messages 
against the number of generated responses in each second of 5-minute intervals. It can be 
seen that between around the 100th second to 160th second of this interval, the number of 
REGISTER requests from users shoots up quickly, while the responses returned by the 
server first dips for about 50-60 seconds before it shoots up also, catching up with the 
number of REGISTER requests, after which everything returns to normal. 
 
Figure 4-15: SIP imported traffic scenario 
In [45], they have examined the number of REGISTER requests generated against the 
number of responses received per user in the 1-minute time period from the 100th second 
to the 160th second. Then, they observed that, instead of the normal one REGISTER 
request and one response per user, many users sent around 2-7 REGISTER requests while 
receiving one or two responses at most per user, until they all successfully register with 
the SIP server. A closer investigation reveals that the problem is caused by the SIP server 
not responding to the user registration requests immediately, triggering users to repeatedly 
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re-transmit their requests within a few seconds until they either give up or receive a 
response with response code 404 Not Found, 408 Request Timeout, or 200 OK. 
The researchers in [45], originally suspected that the surge of the REGISTER requests 
was caused by a DoS attack with spoofed or frivolous REGISTER messages. However, 
they stated that they found the SIP server failed to respond to the user registration requests 
in a timely fashion way, which may be caused by a delay or a slow response from some 
remote (user/call) database with which the SIP server was interacting. What was 
previously mentioned about the imported traffic, although it is not a formal DoS attack 
towards a SIP server, but it represents two main useful attributes: first, a general massive 
drop in the number of responses compared to the requests, so assuming this is can be a 
case of any type of SIP requests that have much fewer responses and this is pretty much 
the DoS scenario; second, they stated the SIP server failed to respond to the user 
registration requests in a timely fashion way, caused by some delay, and any delay or any 
slow response from any computing system or service would be considered a property of  
being under DoS attack, so this also supports a case scenario for the current research to 
test the methodology. 
 
 Detecting DoS attacks on SIP using CUSUM 
Two different methods of applying CUSUM charts, the Offline and the Online, are used 
on the traffic to detect a DoS attack. The first method, the Offline, is when there is a set 
of sequence numbers, which in this case represents the sequence of the requests/responses 
traffic per time unit, with an already pre-known mean of the observations, and then the 
CUSUM technique is applied on the generated traffic with their two scenarios, and applied 
to the imported traffic. 
The second method, the Online, shows a live running system adding a new observation to 
the previously observed sequence set, then the mean is found and updated, then the 
CUSUM technique is applied on both generated traffic with their two scenarios and the 
imported traffic. 
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4.3.1 Generated SIP Traffic Simulation Results using CUSUM 
4.3.1.1 CUSUM on First Scenario: Large Differences 
4.3.1.1.1 Offline implementation 
Figure 4-16 shows the results of the first scenario of having a DoS attack, after applying 
the simple and basic CUSUM equation, with the Offline implementation method from 
equation (3.3). It is clearly shown how it would be hard to identify the attacking starting 
point. 
Another approach of plotting an easier and more noticeable graph is by applying a tabular 
form of CUSUM as mentioned in [19]. This way plots the maximum result of either zero 
or the CUSUM value in order to obtain one upper-sided CUSUM, as in equation (3.4). 
The superscripted plus sign (+) on the right top corner of ( C ) indicates a positive plot 
always over the x-axis, within the positive y-axis area. This scales the graph into showing 
a clearer and an easier way to detect a DoS attack; the graph in Figure 4-17 illustrates how 
for all the time the traffic was running within the normal way, plotted CUSUM values 
were nearly progressing horizontally, in other words, remaining in control, but on the time 
when the attack starts ( t = 100 ), the steep ratio between the requests and the responses 
appears in the chart and the plotted CUSUM values suddenly drifts up out of control. 
 
 
Figure 4-16: SIP First scenario, large differences, basic CUSUM, Offline implementation 
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Figure 4-17: SIP First scenario, large differences Upper sided, Offline implementation 
 
 
Figure 4-18: SIP First scenario, large differences, basic and Upper sided CUSUM, Offline 
implementation 
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The chart in Figure 4-19 shows the plot of the CUSUM with the limits to determine the 
thresholds to a flood attack; these limits are the suspect level of a DoS attack and the alarm 
triggering level to declare an attack is targeting the victim.  
Using the standard deviation ( σ ), a threshold limit was used to sense any increase in the 
CUSUM due to an increase in the request to responses ratio. This is useful to alert the 
victim of possible near future attack, or to detect any slow rate DoS attack, without or just 
before trigging the attack alarm, which in this research is represented as lower theta ( θ ), 
which is twice the value of the standard deviation, depending on how sensitive the 
suspicion alert is desired. 
The plotted graphs in Figure 4-19 shows the upper-sided CUSUM with the suspicion alert 
( θ ) and the triggering alarm threshold ( Θ ), the blue consistent line is the CUSUM values 
plot, the black dashed line is the suspect alert ( θ )  for an increase in the ratio, the empty 
black rounded points are the Boolean flags, either zero or one, to represent a suspected 
DoS attack at a certain time, the red dashed line is the alarm threshold ( Θ ), and the solid 
red points are the Boolean flags, either zero or one, to represent a flooding DoS. This 
method to watch any suspect time point before declaring it as an attack time is useful to 
reduce the false alarm triggering, as it might be just an increase of incoming traffic that is 
affecting the request/response two-way communications and causing some delay in that.  
The chart in Figure 4-20 is a zoom at the period 95 to 110 ( t = [ 95 , 110 ] ), for a better 
and clearer representation of the attack starting point, suspicion flags, and alarm triggering 
points, and how the suspect attack is raised before an alarm is triggered. The attack was 
set in the simulation to start at the time point 100 ( t = 100 ), the blue CUSUM plot first 
crosses the black dashed line, the suspicion alert, then it crosses the red dashed line to 
trigger the attack alarm, so there are empty black points equal to one being printed while 
there are solid red points still shown as zero, then the alarm for the DoS attack is triggered 
to print the red solids as one later on during the attack. 
Chapter 4 
 
66 
 
Figure 4-19: SIP First scenario, large differences, Upper-sided CUSUM with alert and alarm limits, 
Offline implementation 
 
Figure 4-20: SIP First scenario, large differences, zoom at the attack period t = [ 95 , 110 ] , Offline 
implementation 
4.3.1.1.2 Online implementation 
The previous method, the Offline method, was to test a system after finding the mean and 
the standard deviation of a certain sequence of numbers, that is, to represent a system with 
previous knowledge and experience of the ongoing traffic. This reduces the overhead 
spent in finding the mean and the standard deviation every time a new observation is 
added to the sequence, but what if a system is newly starting with no knowledge, or for 
instance a system was reset after detecting a flooding in a current traffic, so the following 
is the other method, the Online method, of getting a new observation and updating the 
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CUSUM after updating the mean and the standard deviation. This method was found by 
applying the basic CUSUM, equation (3.3) as in Figure 4-21, or the upper-sided CUSUM 
equation (3.4) as in Figure 4-22. The chart in Figure 4-23 plots both ways combined. 
The plotted graphs in Figure 4-24 shows the updated upper-sided CUSUM with the 
suspicion alert and the triggering alarm thresholds, the blue consistent line is the updated 
CUSUM values plot, the black dashed line is the suspect alert for an increase in the ratio, 
the empty black rounded points are the Boolean flags, either zero or one, to represent a 
suspected DoS attack at a certain time, the red dashed line is the alarm threshold, and the 
solid red points are the Boolean flags, either zero or one, to represent a flooding DoS.  
The chart in Figure 4-25 is a zoom at the period 95 to 110 ( t = [ 95 , 110 ] ), for a better 
and clearer representation of the attack starting point, suspicion flags, and alarm triggering 
points, and how the suspect attack was raised at the time an alarm was triggered. 
 
 
 
Figure 4-21: SIP First scenario, large differences, basic CUSUM, Online implementation 
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Figure 4-22: SIP First scenario, large differences, upper-sided CUSUM, Online implementation 
 
 
 
Figure 4-23: SIP First scenario, large differences, basic and upper sided CUSUM, Online 
implementation 
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Figure 4-24: SIP First scenario, large differences, upper sided CUSUM with alert and alarm limits, 
Online implementation 
 
 
Figure 4-25: SIP First scenario, large differences, zoom at the attack, t = [ 95 , 110 ] , Online 
implementation 
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4.3.1.2 CUSUM on Second Scenario: Small Differences 
4.3.1.2.1 Offline implementation 
The second scenario of having a DoS attack, where the differences between the requests 
and the responses is small, and barely noticed when plotted on a chart, Figure 4-26 shows 
the results after applying the simple and basic CUSUM in equation (3.3), with the Offline 
implementation; it is clearly shown how it would be hard to identify the attacking starting 
point when represented by the chart. Figure 4-27 illustrates how for all the time the traffic 
was running within the normal way, but on the time when the attack starts ( t = 100 ), the 
small difference in the ratio between the requests and the responses appears well in the 
chart after applying equation (3.4) to get the upper-sided CUSUM. 
 
 
 
Figure 4-26: SIP second scenario, slight differences, basic CUSUM, Offline implementation 
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Figure 4-27: SIP second scenario, slight differences, upper sided CUSUM, Offline implementation 
 
 
 
Figure 4-28: SIP second scenario, slight differences, basic and upper sided CUSUM, Offline 
implementation 
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Figure 4-29 shows the plot of the CUSUM with the limits to determine the thresholds to 
a flood attack. Figure 4-30 is a zoom at the period 95 to 110, ( t = [ 95 , 110 ] ), for a better 
and clearer representation of the attack starting point, suspicion flags, and alarm triggering 
points, and how the suspect attack is raised before an alarm is triggered. 
 
Figure 4-29 SIP second scenario, slight differences, offline upper-sided CUSUM with alert and 
alarm limits, Offline implementation 
 
Figure 4-30: SIP second scenario, slight differences, zoom at the attack period, Offline 
implementation 
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Figure 4-31: SIP second scenario, slight differences, zoom at the slight increase, Offline 
implementation 
Figure 4-31 is a zoom at the period 26 to 31 ( t = [26 , 31 ] ), a slight increase in the ratio 
between the requests and the acknowledged responses, it does cross the alert threshold, 
the black dashed line ( θ ), but it does not cross the alarm threshold, the red dashed line ( 
Θ ). In this scenario, the slight increase was set to represent a slow flooding DoS attack. 
One of two outcomes will be expected: either it is detected and the DoS detection alarm 
will be triggered, and result in a false alarm, or it will be missed and the slow attack will 
not be detected; so in this scenario, the alert will be raised to monitor the traffic behaviour 
for any either continuous slow attack, or an alert for a near future DoS attack, unless the 
ratio decreases, the alert will stay turned on, if it increases then the DoS attack alarm will 
be triggered. 
4.3.1.2.2 Online implementation 
The previous method was the Offline method to test a system after finding the mean and 
the standard deviation of a certain sequence of numbers, that is, to represent a system with 
previous knowledge and experience of the ongoing traffic. This reduces the overhead 
spent in finding the mean and the standard deviation every time a new observation is 
added to the sequence, but what if a system is newly starting with no knowledge, or for 
instance a system was reset after detecting a flooding in a current traffic, so the following 
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is the other method, the Online method, of getting a new observation and updating the 
CUSUM after updating the mean and the standard deviation. Figure 4-32 shows the plot 
of the basic CUSUM from equation (3.3), or the upper-sided CUSUM equation (3.4) as 
in Figure 4-33. The chart in Figure 4-34 plots both ways combined. 
 
 
Figure 4-32: SIP second scenario, slight differences, basic CUSUM, Online implementation 
 
 
Figure 4-33: SIP second scenario, slight differences, upper-sided CUSUM, Online implementation 
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Figure 4-34: SIP second scenario, slight differences, basic and upper-sided CUSUM, Online 
implementation 
 
Figure 4-35 shows the Online implementation of the upper-sided CUSUM with the 
suspicion alert ( θ ) and the triggering alarm threshold ( Θ ). Figure 4-36 is a zoom at the 
period 95 to 110 ( t = [ 95 , 110 ] ), for a better and clearer representation of the attack 
starting point, suspicion flags, and alarm triggering points, and how the suspect attack is 
raised at time 100 before an alarm is triggered later within the simulation time, the blue 
CUSUM plot first crosses the black dashed line, the suspicion alert, then it crosses the red 
dashed line to trigger the attack alarm, so there are empty black points equal to one being 
printed while there are solid red points still shown as zero, then the alarm for the DoS 
attack is triggered to print the red solids as one later on during the attack. 
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Figure 4-35: SIP second scenario, slight differences, upper-sided CUSUM with alert and alarm 
limits, Online implementation 
 
 
 
Figure 4-36: SIP second scenario, slight differences, Zoom at the attack period, Online 
implementation 
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Figure 4-37: SIP second scenario, slight differences, zoom at the slight increase period, Online 
implementation 
4.3.2 CUSUM on Imported Traffic’s Data Set 
4.3.2.1 Offline implementation 
The traffic imported from [45], or from the extended version [46], was shown in Figure 
4-15 in section (4.2). Figure 4-38 shows the basic CUSUM results, after applying equation 
(3.3), with the Offline method of pre-found mean ( µ ) and standard deviation ( σ ), it is 
clearly shown how it would be hard to identify the attack starting point when represented 
by the chart. After applying equation (3.4), the attack starting point appears well in Figure 
4-39 to get the Offline upper sided CUSUM. Figure 4-40 shows the results of both 
equation (3.3) and (3.4). 
 
Figure 4-38: SIP imported traffic, basic CUSUM, Offline implementation 
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Figure 4-39: SIP imported traffic, upper sided CUSUM, Offline implementation 
 
 
Figure 4-40: SIP imported traffic, Offline basic and upper-sided CUSUM, Offline implementation 
 
The graph in Figure 4-41 shows the Offline upper-sided CUSUM with the suspicion alert 
and the triggering alarm thresholds. The attack started around the 100th second and ended 
around 160th; the blue CUSUM plot first crosses the black dashed line, the suspicion alert 
( θ ), then it crosses the red dashed line ( Θ ), to trigger the attack alarm, so there are empty 
black points equal to one being printed while there are solid red points still shown as zero, 
then the alarm for the DoS attack is triggered to print the red solids as one, later on during 
the attack.  
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Figure 4-41: SIP imported traffic, upper-sided CUSUM with the alert and alarm levels, Offline 
implementation 
 
Figure 4-42: SIP imported traffic, zoom at the reset Offline upper-sided CUSUM and the levels, 
Offline implementation 
4.3.2.2 Online implementation 
Figure 4-43 shows the Online basic CUSUM results, after applying equation (3.3). After 
applying equation (3.4), the attack starting point appears well in Figure 4-44 to get the 
Online upper-sided CUSUM with the method of updated mean ( µ ) and standard 
deviation ( σ ). Figure 4-45 shows the results of both equation (3.3) and (3.4) combined. 
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Figure 4-43: SIP imported traffic, updated basic CUSUM, Online implementation 
 
 
 
Figure 4-44: SIP imported traffic, updated upper-sided CUSUM, Online implementation 
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Figure 4-45: SIP imported traffic, updated basic upper-sided CUSUM, Online implementation 
 
Figure 4-46: SIP imported traffic, updated upper sided CUSUM with suspicion and alarm limits, 
Online implementation 
The plotted graphs in Figure 4-46 shows the Online upper-sided CUSUM with the 
suspicion alert and the triggering alarm thresholds. The chart in Figure 4-47 is a zoom at 
the period 95 to 184 ( t = [ 95 , 184 ] ), for a better and clearer representation of the attack 
starting point, suspicion flags, and alarm triggering points, and how the suspect attack is 
raised before an alarm is triggered. 
Figure 4-48 is a zoom at the period 64 to 84 ( t = [ 64 , 84 ] ), a slight increase in the ratio 
between the requests and the acknowledged responses, it touches the alert threshold, the 
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black dashed line (θ); in this scenario, the slight increase was set to represent a slow 
flooding DoS attack. One of two outcomes will be expected: either it is detected and the 
DoS detection alarm will be triggered, and result in a false alarm, or it will be missed and 
the slow attack will not be detected; so in this scenario, the alert will be raised to monitor 
the traffic behaviour for any either continuous slow attack, or an alert for a near future 
DoS attack, unless the ratio decreases, the alert will stay turned on, if it increases then the 
DoS attack alarm will be triggered. 
 
Figure 4-47: SIP imported traffic, zoom at the attack period, Online implementation 
 
Figure 4-48: SIP imported traffic, zoom at the slight increase, Online implementation 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
95 104 111 120 130 138 147 154 163 171 177 184
C
U
S
U
M
, 
li
m
it
s,
 f
la
g
s
Time units
 UPDATED upper sided CUSUM θ suspect Θ alarm
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
64 65 67 68 70 72 74 78 81 84
C
U
S
U
M
, 
li
m
it
s,
 f
la
g
s
Time units
 UPDATED upper
sided CUSUM
θ
suspect
Θ
alarm
Chapter 4 
 
83 
 Detecting DoS attacks on SIP using EWMA 
There are two different methods of applying EWMA charts on the traffic to detect a DoS 
attack. The first method, the Offline implementation, is applied when there is a set of 
sequence numbers, which in this case represents the sequence of the requests/responses 
traffic per time unit, with an already pre-known mean of the observations, and then the 
EWMA technique is applied on both generated traffic with both two generated scenarios, 
and the imported traffic. The second method, the Online implementation, shows a live 
running system adding a new observation to the previously observed sequence set, then 
the mean is found and updated, then the EWMA technique is applied. 
4.4.1 EWMA on Simulation Generated Data Set  
4.4.1.1 EWMA on First Scenario: Large Differences 
4.4.1.1.1 Offline implementation 
Figure 4-49 shows the graph results after applying the EWMA equation (3.10) on the first 
simulated DoS attack scenario, with the Offline implementation. Figure 4-50 illustrates 
how for all the time the traffic was running within the normal way, but on the time the 
attack starts, the steep ratio between the requests and the responses appears well in the 
chart in the EWMA plot, the blue consistent, with the limits to determine the thresholds 
to detect flood attacks. 
 
Figure 4-49: SIP imported traffic, large differences, basic EWMA, Offline implementation 
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The first limit is the suspect level of a DoS attack ( θ ), the black dashed line, with  the 
width of the control limit parameter L equal to 2, ( L = 2 ), and the suspect alert for an 
increase in the ratio, the empty black rounded points are the Boolean flags, either zero or 
one, and the alarm triggering level ( Θ ), the red dashed line, using the equation (3.12) 
with the width of the control limit parameter L equal to 3 ( L = 3 ), to declare an attack is 
targeting the victim, the solid red points are the Boolean flags, either zero or one. 
 
Figure 4-50: SIP imported traffic, large differences, EWMA with alert and alarm limits, Offline 
implementation 
 
Figure 4-51: SIP imported traffic, large differences, zoom at the attack period t = [ 95 , 110 ] , 
Offline implementation 
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The chart in Figure 4-51 is a zoom at the period 95 to 110 ( t = [ 95 , 110 ] ), for a better 
and clearer representation of the attack starting point, suspicion flags, and alarm triggering 
points, and how the suspect attack is raised before an alarm is triggered. The attack was 
set in the simulation to start at the time point 100 ( t = 100 ), the blue EWMA plot first 
crosses the black dashed line, the suspicion alert, then it crosses the red dashed line to 
trigger the DoS attack alarm to print the red solids as one later on during the attack. 
4.4.1.1.2 Online implementation 
Figure 4-52 shows the graph results after applying the EWMA equation (3.10) on the first 
simulated DoS attack scenario, with the Online implementation getting a new observation 
and updating the mean and the standard deviation.  
The plotted graphs in Figure 4-53 show the Online implementation of EWMA, with the 
suspicion alert and the triggering alarm thresholds. The chart in Figure 4-54 is a zoom at 
the period 95 to 109 ( t = [ 95 , 109 ] ), for a better and clearer representation of the attack 
starting point, the EWMA plot in blue consistent line crosses the black dashed line, the 
suspicion alert, and then it crosses the red dashed line, so the empty black ring and the 
solid red points are printed as attention and alarm flags. 
 
 
Figure 4-52: SIP imported traffic, large differences, updated EWMA, Online implementation 
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Figure 4-53: SIP imported traffic, large differences, updated EWMA with alert and alarm limits, 
Online implementation 
 
Figure 4-54: SIP imported traffic, large differences, zoom at the attack period ( t = [ 95 , 109 ] ) , 
Online implementation 
4.4.1.2 EWMA on Second Scenario: Small Differences 
4.4.1.2.1  Offline implementation 
Figure 4-55 shows the results of the second scenario of having a DoS attack, after applying 
the simple EWMA in equation (3.10), with the Offline method. This is the scenario where 
the differences between the requests and the responses is small, are barely noticed when 
plotted on a chart, compared to the first scenario. 
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Figure 4-56 shows the plot of the EWMA with the limits to determine the thresholds of a 
flood attack, the suspect level and the alarm triggering level using the equation (3.12). 
The chart in Figure 4-57 is a zoom at the period 95 to 109 ( t = [ 95 , 109 ] ). Figure 4-58 
is a zoom at the period 26 to 29 ( t = [26 , 29 ] ), a slight increase in the ratio between the 
requests and the acknowledged responses, it touches the alert threshold, the black dashed 
line ( θ ), in this scenario, the slight increase was set to represent a slow flooding DoS 
attack. The alert will be raised to monitor the traffic behaviour for either a continuous 
slow attack, or an alert for a near future DoS attack; unless the ratio decreases, the alert 
will stay turned on, if it increases then the DoS attack alarm will be triggered. 
 
Figure 4-55: SIP second scenario, slight differences, Basic EWMA, Offline implementation 
 
Figure 4-56: SIP second scenario, slight differences, EWMA, alert alarm, Offline implementation 
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Figure 4-57: SIP second scenario, slight differences zoom at the attack period t = [ 95 , 110 ] , 
Offline implementation 
 
Figure 4-58: SIP second scenario, slight differences, zoom at the slight increase, Offline 
implementation 
4.4.1.2.2 Online implementation 
Figure 4-59 shows the basic EWMA after applying equation (3.10), on the second 
scenario traffic. Figure 4-60 shows the updated upper-sided EWMA with the suspicion 
alert and the triggering alarm thresholds. The plotted graphs in Figure 4-61 is a zoom at 
the period 95 to 110 ( t = [ 95 , 110 ] ), for a better and clearer representation of the attack 
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starting point, suspicion flags, and alarm triggering points, and how the suspect attack was 
raised at the time an alarm was triggered. 
Figure 4-62 is a zoom at the period 26 to 29 ( t = [26 , 29 ] ), a slight increase in the ratio 
between the requests and the acknowledged responses, it touches the alert threshold, the 
black dashed line ( θ ), in this scenario, the slight increase was set to represent a slow 
flooding DoS attack, one of two outcomes will be expected: either it is detected and the 
DoS detection alarm will be triggered, and result in a false alarm, or it will be missed and 
the slow attack will not be detected. So in this scenario, the alert will be raised to monitor 
the traffic behaviour for either a continuous slow attack, or an alert for a near future DoS 
attack, unless the ratio decreases, the alert will stay turned on, if it increases then the DoS 
attack alarm will be triggered. 
 
Figure 4-59: SIP second scenario, slight differences, updated EWMA, Online implementation 
 
Figure 4-60: SIP second scenario, slight differences, updated EWMA with alert and alarm limits, 
Online implementation 
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Figure 4-61: SIP second scenario, slight differences, zoom at the attack period ( t = [ 95 , 110 ] ) , 
Online implementation 
 
 
Figure 4-62: SIP second scenario, slight differences, zoom at the slight increase, Online 
implementation 
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4.4.2 EWMA on SIP Imported Data Set 
4.4.2.1 Offline implementation 
Figure 4-63 shows the results of having a DoS attack, after applying the EWMA equation 
(3.10), with pre-found statistics, the Offline implementation method. Figure 4-64 
illustrates how for all the time the traffic was running within the normal way, but at the 
time when the attack starts, the steep ratio between the requests and the responses appears 
well in the chart, with the limits to determine the thresholds to a flood attack; these limits 
are the suspect level of a DoS attack and the alarm triggering level to declare an attack is 
targeting the victim. 
The level of threshold is represented as upper theta ( Θ ), using the equation (3.12) with  
the width of the control limit parameter L equal to 3 ( L = 3 ) as recommended by 
Montgomery [19]. However, another threshold limit was set to sense any increase in the 
EWMA due to an increase in the ratio; this is useful to alert the victim of a possible near 
future attack, or to detect any slow rate DoS attack, without or just before triggering the 
attack alarm, is represented as lower theta ( θ ), with the width of the control limit 
parameter L equal to 2 ( L = 2 ). 
The plotted graphs in Figure 4-64 shows the EWMA with the suspicion alert and the 
triggering alarm thresholds, the blue consistent line is the EWMA values plot, the black 
dashed line is the suspect alert for an increase in the ratio, the empty black rounded points 
are the Boolean flags, either zero or one, to represent a suspected DoS attack at a certain 
time, the red dashed line is the alarm threshold, and the solid red points are the Boolean 
flags, either zero or one, to represent a flooding DoS. 
The chart in Figure 4-65 is a zoom at the period 70 to 180 ( t = [ 70 , 180 ] ), for a better 
and clearer representation of the attack starting point, suspicion flags, and alarm triggering 
points, and how the suspect attack is raised before an alarm is triggered. The attack was 
around the 100th second to 160th second of this interval ( t = [ 100 , 160 ] ), the blue 
EWMA plot first crosses the black dashed line, the suspicion alert, then it crosses the red 
dashed line to trigger the attack alarm, so there are empty black points equal to one being 
printed while there are solid red points still shown as zero, then the alarm for the DoS 
attack is triggered to print the red solids as one later on during the attack. 
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Figure 4-63: SIP Imported traffic, basic EWMA on imported traffic, Offline implementation 
 
 
 
Figure 4-64: SIP Imported traffic, basic EWMA with alert and alarm limits, Offline 
implementation 
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Figure 4-65: SIP Imported traffic, zoom at the attack t = [ 70 , 180 ] , Offline implementation 
4.4.2.2 Online implementation 
Figure 4-66 shows the results of having a DoS attack, after applying the EWMA equation, 
with the Online implementation method from equation (3.10). The plotted graphs in 
Figure 4-67 shows the Online implementation of EWMA with the suspicion alert and the 
triggering alarm thresholds. The attack was around the 100th second to 160th second of 
this interval ( t = [ 100 , 160 ] ), the blue EWMA plot first crosses the black dashed line, 
the suspicion alert, then it crosses the red dashed line to trigger the attack alarm, so there 
might be empty black points plotted as value equals one, while there are solid red points 
still shown as zero, then the alarm for the DoS attack is triggered to print the red solids as 
one later on during the attack. This method to watch any suspect time point before 
declaring it as an attack time is useful to reduce the false alarm triggering, as it might be 
just an increase of an incoming traffic that is affecting the request/response two-way 
communications and causing some delay in that. The chart in Figure 4-68 is a zoom at the 
period 70 to 180 ( t = [ 70 , 180 ] ), for a better and clearer representation of the attack 
starting point, suspicion flags, and alarm triggering points, and how the suspect attack is 
raised before an alarm is triggered. 
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Figure 4-66: SIP Imported traffic, updated EWMA on imported traffic, Online implementation 
 
 
 
Figure 4-67: SIP imported traffic, updated EWMA with alert and alarm limits, Online 
implementation 
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0 7 16 26 35 41 51 58 64 72 87 97 108 119 130 140 151 161 171 179 189 196 203 212
E
W
M
A
, 
li
m
it
s,
 f
la
g
s
Time units
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
0 7 16 26 35 41 51 58 64 72 87 97 108 119 130 140 151 161 171 179 189 196 203 212E
W
M
A
, 
li
m
it
s,
 f
la
g
s
Time units
updated EWMA θ alert Θ alarm
Chapter 4 
 
95 
 
 
Figure 4-68: SIP Imported traffic, zoom at the attack t = [ 70 , 180 ] , Online implementation 
 Summary 
This chapter has discussed the results of Denial of Service attacks against SIP. First an 
OPNET simulation run had shown the powerful impact of flood attacks and how it can 
affect and stop the service that is offered by the SIP entity which is a SIP server. 
There were other scenarios of traffic running, some scenarios were about large differences 
and ratios of the acknowledged and the non-acknowledged requests; another scenario 
where there was a slight difference in the increase in the ratio. There was another scenario 
where the traffic was real and imported from another piece of research. 
Cumulative Summation (CUSUM) and Exponentially Weighted Moving Average 
(EWMA) were the techniques used to detect the attack in all the traffic, both the generated 
and the imported.  
These techniques were used in two approaches: the Offline implementation works by 
finding the statistical values of the whole observations, the mean and the standard 
deviation, then applying the equations; the second approach, the Online implementation, 
was by updating the mean and the standard deviation values then applying the equations. 
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The first approach represents a system with previous knowledge and experience of the 
ongoing traffic; this reduces the overhead spent in finding the mean and the standard 
deviation every time a new observation is added to the sequence. The second approach 
represents a system which is newly starting with no knowledge, or a system which was 
reset, for instance, after detecting flooding in current traffic. 
It was observed that CUSUM is a more effective and powerful technique to detect larger 
increases in the traffic, while EWMA was much more powerful in spotting slight changes, 
or in other words, to detect slow rate attacks and to reduce the false alarms that might 
happen. Figure 4-69 is an example to summarise and show how the CUSUM plot, in 
dashed black, and its alarm threshold ( Θ - CUSUM), in red, goes higher than the EWMA 
plot, in blue, and its alarm threshold ( Θ - EWMA ). 
Figure 4-70 shows a zoom at the attack time t = [ 95 , 104 ]; it clearly shows how the blue 
line starts going up earlier than the dashed black so an earlier attention is raised, indicating 
an earlier attack detection. 
 
 
Figure 4-69: Detection DoS on SIP, EWMA vs. CUSUM, attack start at t = 100, EWMA goes up 
slightly before CUSUM 
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Figure 4-70 Zoom at the attack time t = [ 95 , 104 ], DoS on SIP, EWMA vs. CUSUM 
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 DoS Targeting SPDY / HTTP 2.0: Results 
and Analysis 
  Traffic Generation 
SPDY traffic flow was designed to reduce the load time of web pages, especially those 
pages that have many resources or objects to be retrieved. SPDY works in a way a user 
sends a single TCP stream per page, and a SPDY proxy server deals with the needed 
resources by establishing the number of TCP connections according to the number of 
objects the user needs. A very possible and easy flooding attack may happen when a user 
sends several single TCP streams, each containing a massive number of resources to be 
loaded and retrieved. If the number of the open TCP connections that are used in retrieving 
the web objects is bigger than the limit a SPDY proxy server can handle, then the SPDY 
proxy server will get busy in processing the connections, and dealing with the queued 
waiting connections to be established and achieved. 
 
Figure 5-1: SPDY Scenario network architecture 
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The simulation scenario was set to run for a one hour period of time, divided into 60 time 
slots, each one minute long, starting at 13:00. There have been 10 users connected in a 
FQDM domain (Fully Qualified Domain Name) to a SPDY proxy server, each user 
normally sends a web page request consisting of single TCP stream to the proxy server, 
each stream with several web objects to be retrieved. The scenario ran normally until the 
minute 13:22; user number 6 was set to be the attacker, where this user sends on average 
10 times more resources to be retrieved than a normal user would do. The sequential 
observations were the total number of requests sent to the SPDY proxy server, which are 
the results of the number of TCP streams times the number of resources per TCP stream. 
Figure 5-1 shows the network structure for the scenario’s generated traffic 
The input observations for the detection algorithm were the result of the multiplication of 
the total number of TCP streams sent by one user, by the average of resources requested in 
a TCP stream, to give the total number of resources requested from a user in a one minute 
time slot. The generated set was classified into two different scenarios according to how 
steep is the increase of the requests that is needed to be processed; the first scenario was set 
to process a large increase, while the second scenario was set to process a slight increase. 
 
Figure 5-2: First scenario, large increase, total number of resources requested by user 1 and user 6 
per minute 
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Figure 5-3: Second scenario, slight increase, total number of resources requested by user 1 and user 6 
per minute 
Figure 5-2 shows the first scenario with the total number of resources requested by user 1 
and user 6 per minute, and Figure 5-3 shows the second scenario with the total number of 
resources requested by user 1 and user 6 per minute. User 1 was picked to show as an 
example on a normal running user, while user 6 was set to be the attacker as mentioned 
earlier. 
 Detecting DoS attacks on SPDY using CUSUM 
5.2.1 CUSUM on SPDY First Scenario: Large increase 
5.2.1.1 Offline implementation 
Figure 5-4 shows the results of having a flood attack from user 6; the red dashed line is the 
simple and basic CUSUM equation, with the offline implementation from equation (3.4), 
it is clearly shown how it would be hard to identify the attacking starting point. The blue 
consistent line is after applying a tabular form of CUSUM as in equation (3.4). The other 
approach of plotting makes it easier and a more noticeable graph as mentioned in [19]; this 
way plots the maximum result of either zero or the CUSUM value in order to obtain one 
upper-sided CUSUM. 
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Figure 5-4: SPDY First scenario, large increase, user 6 basic and upper-sided CUSUM, offline 
implementation 
 
Figure 5-5: SPDY First scenario, large increase, user 6 upper sided CUSUM with alert and alarm 
limits, offline implementation 
The graph in Figure 5-5 illustrates how for all the time the traffic was running within the 
normal way, but on the time when the attack starts, the steep increase in the number of the 
sent requests from user 6, the chart shows the plot of the CUSUM with the limits to 
determine the thresholds to a flood attack; these limits are the suspect level of a DoS attack, 
at minute 22, and the alarm triggering level to declare an attack is targeting the victim. The 
blue consistent line is the CUSUM values plot, the black dashed line is the suspect alert for 
an increase in the ratio, the empty black rounded points are the Boolean flags, either zero 
or one, to represent a suspected DoS attack at a certain time, the red dashed line is the alarm 
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threshold, and the solid red points are the Boolean flags, either zero or one, to represent a 
flooding DoS. The attack was set in the simulation to start at the time point 22 ( t = 22 ), 
the blue CUSUM plot first crosses the black dashed line, the suspicion alert, then it crosses 
the red dashed line to trigger the attack alarm, so there are empty black points equal to one 
being printed while there are solid red points still shown as zero, then the alarm for the DoS 
attack is triggered to print the red solids as one later on during the attack. This method to 
watch any suspect time point before declaring it as an attack time is useful to reduce the 
false alarm triggering, as it might be just an increase of incoming traffic. 
The chart in Figure 5-6 is a zoom at the time period 20 to 29 minutes ( t = [ 20 , 29 ] ), for 
a better and clearer representation of the attack starting point, suspicion flags, and alarm 
triggering points, and how the suspect attack is raised before an alarm is triggered. 
 
Figure 5-6: SPDY First scenario, large increase, zoom at the attack period, offline implementation 
5.2.1.2 Online implementation 
The previous implementation was to test a system after finding the mean and the standard 
deviation of  the whole sequence of the numbers; that method represents a system with 
previous knowledge and experience of the ongoing traffic, this reduces the overhead spent 
in finding the mean and the standard deviation, then using them every time a new 
observation is added to the sequence, so in case a system is newly starting with no 
knowledge, or a system was reset, for instance, after detecting flooding in current traffic. 
So the following is the other method of getting a new observation and finding the updated 
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CUSUM after updating the mean and the standard deviation. Figure 5-8 shows the plot after 
the online implementation when applying the basic CUSUM in equation (3.3), and the 
upper-sided CUSUM in equation (3.4). The red dashed line is the simple and basic CUSUM 
equation, the blue consistent line. The figure plots both ways.  
 
Figure 5-7: SPDY First scenario, large increase, basic and upper-sided CUSUM on the updated 
method, online implementation 
 
 
Figure 5-8: SPDY First scenario, large increase, user 6 updated upper-sided CUSUM with alert and 
alarm limits, online implementation 
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Figure 5-9: SPDY First scenario, large increase, zoom at the attack period, online implementation 
The plotted graphs in Figure 5-8 shows the online implementation of the upper-sided 
CUSUM with the suspicion alert and the triggering alarm thresholds, the attack started at 
the time point 22 ( t = 22 ). The chart in Figure 5-9 is a zoom at the time period 20 to 29 
minutes ( t = [ 20 , 29 ] ), for a better and clearer representation of the attack starting point, 
suspicion flags, and alarm triggering points, and how the suspect attack is raised before an 
alarm is triggered; the blue CUSUM plot first crosses the black dashed line, the suspicion 
alert, then it crosses the red dashed line to trigger the attack alarm, so there might be empty 
black points plotted as value equals one, while there are solid red points still shown as zero, 
then the alarm for the DoS attack is triggered to print the red solids as one later on during 
the attack. 
5.2.2 CUSUM on SPDY Second Scenario: Slight Increase 
5.2.2.1 Offline implementation 
 
Figure 5-10 shows the results of having a flood attack from user 6; the red dashed line is 
the offline implementation of the simple and basic CUSUM equation (3.4), and it is clearly 
shown how it would be hard to identify the attacking starting point. The blue consistent line 
is after applying a tabular form of CUSUM as in equation (3.4).  
The graph in Figure 5-11 illustrates how for all the time the traffic was running within the 
normal way, but on the time when the attack starts, the steep increase in the number of the 
sent requests from user 6, the chart shows the plot of the CUSUM with the limits to 
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determine the thresholds to a flood attack; these limits are the suspect level of a DoS attack, 
at minute 22 ( t = 22 ), and the alarm triggering level to declare an attack is targeting the 
victim. The blue consistent line is the CUSUM values plot, the black dashed line is the 
suspect alert for an increase in the ratio, the empty black rounded points are the Boolean 
flags, either zero or one, to represent a suspected DoS attack at a certain time, the red dashed 
line is the alarm threshold, and the solid red points are the Boolean flags, either zero or one, 
to represent a flooding DoS. 
The chart in Figure 5-12 is a zoom at the time period 20 to 31 minutes ( t = [ 20 , 31 ] ), for 
a better and clearer representation of the attack starting point, suspicion flags, and alarm 
triggering points, and how the suspect attack is raised before an alarm is triggered. The blue 
CUSUM plot first crosses the black dashed line, the suspicion alert, then it crosses the red 
dashed line to trigger the attack alarm, so there are empty black points equal to one being 
printed while there are solid red points still shown as zero, then the alarm for the DoS attack 
is triggered to print the red solids as one later on during the attack.  
 
Figure 5-10: SPDY Second scenario, slight increase, user 6 basic and upper-sided CUSUM, online 
implementation 
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Figure 5-11: SPDY Second scenario, slight increase, user 6 upper-sided CUSUM with alert and alarm 
limits, online implementation 
 
Figure 5-12 : SPDY Second scenario, slight increase, a zoom at the attack period, online 
implementation 
5.2.2.2 Online implementation 
Figure 5-13 shows the plot after applying the basic CUSUM in equation (3.3), and the 
upper-sided CUSUM in equation (3.4) with the online implementation. The red dashed line 
is the simple and basic CUSUM equation, the blue consistent line. The figure plots both 
ways. 
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The plotted graphs in Figure 5-14 show the updated upper-sided CUSUM with the 
suspicion alert and the triggering alarm thresholds. The chart in Figure 5-15 is a zoom at 
the time period 20 to 29 minutes ( t = [ 20 , 29 ] ), for a better and clearer representation of 
the attack starting point as the attack was set in the simulation to start at the time point 22 
( t = 22 ), suspicion flags, and alarm triggering points, and how the suspect attack is raised 
before an alarm is triggered. The blue CUSUM plot first crosses the black dashed line, the 
suspicion alert, then it crosses the red dashed line to trigger the attack alarm, so there might 
be empty black points plotted as value equals one, while there are solid red points still 
shown as zero, then the alarm for the DoS attack is triggered to print the red solids as one 
later on during the attack. 
 
 
Figure 5-13: SPDY Second scenario, slight increase, basic and upper-sided CUSUM on the updated 
method, online implementation 
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Figure 5-14: SPDY Second scenario, slight increase, user 6 updated upper-sided CUSUM with alert 
and alarm limits, online implementation 
 
Figure 5-15: SPDY Second scenario, online implementation, slight increase, zoom at the attack 
period, online implementation 
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 Detecting DoS attacks on SPDY using EWMA 
5.3.1 EWMA on First Scenario: Large increase 
5.3.1.1 Offline implementation 
When EWMA charts are applied here on the previous data sets, the following results are 
illustrated in the plotted graphs and discussed later on in this section.  
Figure 5-16 shows the results of a DoS attack, after applying the EWMA equation, with a 
pre-found mean method from equation (3.10). Figure 5-17 shows for all the time the traffic 
was running normally, but at the time when the attack starts, the steep increase in the 
number of the total requests and the responses appears well in the chart, with the limits to 
determine the thresholds to a flood attack; these limits are the suspect level of a DoS attack 
and the alarm triggering level to declare an attack is targeting the victim. 
The level of threshold in this research is represented as upper theta ( Θ ), using the equation 
(3.12) with the width of the control limit parameter L equal to 3 ( L = 3 ) as recommended 
by Montgomery [19]. However, another threshold limit was set to sense any increase in the 
EWMA due to an increase in the ratio; this is useful to alert the victim of possible near 
future attack, or to detect any slow rate DoS attack, without or just before trigging the attack 
alarm, which in this research is represented as lower theta ( θ ), with  the width of the control 
limit parameter L equal to 2, ( L = 2 ). 
The chart in Figure 5-18 is a zoom at the period 20 to 28 ( t = [ 20 , 28 ] ), for a better and 
clearer representation of the attack starting point, suspicion flags, and alarm triggering 
points, and how the suspect attack is raised before an alarm is triggered. The attack was set 
in the simulation to start at the time point 22 ( t = 22 ); the blue EWMA plot first crosses 
the black dashed line, the suspicion alert, then it crosses the red dashed line to trigger the 
attack alarm, so there are empty black points equal to one being printed while there are 
solid red points still shown as zero, then the alarm for the DoS attack is triggered to print 
the red solids as one later on during the attack. 
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Figure 5-16: SPDY first scenario, large increase, basic EWMA, offline implementation 
 
Figure 5-17: SPDY first scenario, large increase, EWMA with alert and alarm limits, offline 
implementation 
 
Figure 5-18: SPDY first scenario, large increase, a zoom at the attack period, offline implementation 
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5.3.1.2 Online implementation 
Figure 5-19 shows an online implementation of EWMA equation (3.12). The plotted graphs 
in Figure 5-20 show the updated EWMA with the suspicion alert and the triggering alarm 
thresholds and the flags. The chart in Figure 5-21 is a zoom at the period 20 to 28 ( t = [ 20 
, 28 ] ),  around the attack starting time point 22 ( t = 22 ), the updated EWMA blue 
consistent line crosses the black dashed line, the suspicion alert, then it crosses the red 
dashed line to trigger the attack alarm. 
 
Figure 5-19: SPDY first scenario, large increase, updated EWMA, online implementation 
 
Figure 5-20: SPDY first scenario, large increase, updated EWMA with alert and alarm limits, online 
implementation 
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Figure 5-21: SPDY first scenario, large increase, zoom at the attack level, online implementation 
5.3.2 EWMA on Second Scenario: Slight Increase 
5.3.2.1 Offline implementation 
Figure 5-22 shows the results of a DoS attack, after applying the EWMA equation with the 
Offline implementation from equation (3.10).  
 
 
Figure 5-22: SPDY Second scenario, slight increase, Basic EWMA, offline implementation 
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Figure 5-23: SPDY Second scenario, slight increase, EWMA with alert and alarm limits, offline 
implementation 
 
Figure 5-24: SPDY Second scenario, slight increase, zoom at the attack period 
The plotted graphs in Figure 5-23 show EWMA with the suspicion alert and the triggering 
alarm thresholds. The chart in Figure 5-24 is a zoom at the period 20 to 28 ( t = [ 20 , 28 ] 
), for a better and clearer representation of the attack starting point, ( t = 22 );  the blue 
EWMA plot first crosses the black dashed line, then it crosses the red dashed line to trigger 
the attack alarm, so there are empty black points equal to one and the red solids are also 
printed as one during attack. 
5.3.2.2 Online implementation 
Figure 5-25 shows the results of a DoS attack, after applying the EWMA equation with the 
Offline implementation from equation (3.10).  
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The plotted graphs in Figure 5-26 show EWMA with the suspicion alert and the triggering 
alarm thresholds as in equation (3.12). The chart in Figure 5-27 is a zoom at the period 20 
to 28 ( t = [ 20 , 28 ] ), for a better and clearer representation of the attack starting point, ( t 
= 22 ), the blue EWMA plot first crosses the black dashed line, then it crosses the red dashed 
line to trigger the attack alarm, so there are empty black points equal to one and the red 
solids are also printed as one during the attack. 
  
Figure 5-25: SPDY Second scenario, slight increase, updated EWMA, online implementation 
 
 
Figure 5-26: SPDY Second scenario, slight increase, updated EWMA with alert and alarm limits, 
online implementation 
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Figure 5-27: SPDY Second scenario, slight increase, a zoom at the attack level, online implementation 
 Summary 
This chapter has discussed the results of Denial of Service attacks against the SPDY 
protocol. There were some scenarios of traffic running, one scenario was about large 
differences and the result of total requests sent by a user; another scenario was with a slight 
increase and the result of total requests sent by a user. 
CUSUM and EWMA were the techniques used to detect the attack in all the traffic, both 
the generated and the imported. These techniques were used in two approaches. The first 
by finding the statistical values of the whole observations, the mean and the standard 
deviation, then applying the equations; the second approach was by updating the mean and 
the standard deviation values then applying the equations. The first approach represents a 
system with previous knowledge and experience of the ongoing traffic; this reduces the 
overhead spent in finding the mean and the standard deviation every time a new observation 
is added to the sequence The second approach represents a system which is newly starting 
with no knowledge, or a system which was reset, for instance, after detecting flooding in 
current traffic. 
It was observed that CUSUM is a more powerful technique to detect larger increases in the 
traffic, while EWMA was much more powerful in spotting slight changes, or in other 
words, to detect slow rate attacks and to reduce the false alarms that might happen. Figure 
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5-28 is an example to summarise and show how the CUSUM plot, in dashed black, and its 
alarm threshold ( Θ - CUSUM), in red, goes higher than the EWMA plot, in blue, and its 
alarm threshold ( Θ - EWMA ), in green. Figure 5-29 is a zoom at the attack starting time; 
it clearly shows how even the blue line starts going up earlier than the dashed black line, 
so an earlier attention is raised. 
 
Figure 5-28: Detection DoS on SPDY, EWMA vs. CUSUM attack start at t = 22, EWMA goes up 
slightly before CUSUM 
 
Figure 5-29: A zoom at the attack time t = [ 22 , 26 ], DoS on SPDY, EWMA vs. CUSUM
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 A DoS resilience Framework  
This chapter provides architecture for techniques described in the previous chapters, and 
how these techniques can be implemented in a useful system that can be used in real life. 
 Architecture of the DoS resilient frame work 
This research has shown the serious impact of Flooding Denial of Service (DoS) attacks 
against the application layer protocols: Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) and SPDY, the 
new proposed draft for Hyper Text Transfer Protocol version 2.0 (HTTP 2.0). There are 
many solutions and systems offered so far to this problem, but the majority of these systems 
offer it partially, no complete or integrated system that attempts to cover all possible 
flooding DoS attacks against these protocols.  
The proposed system in Chapters 4 and 5 can be fulfilled within a security solution for the 
current flooding DoS attacks. The specifications will be designed to protect against DoS 
and Distributed DoS (DDoS), an integrated system which employs Statistical Processing 
Control (SPC) techniques to tackle different possible flooding attacks. 
Figure 6-1 illustrates a general design of the framework. The architecture consists mainly 
of two protection parts: 
1. Inbound traffic monitor: to detect an incoming flow of DoS attacks to protect any 
prospective victim existing on an internal domain. 
2. Outbound traffic monitor: to detect an incoming flow for Outgoing DoS attacks, 
and to protect any prospective victim existing on external domains. 
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Figure 6-1: General design and component of the proposed framework 
 Framework’s First Part: Inbound Traffic Monitor 
This part of the system will be deployed relatively closer to the computing system side, 
either on the end system itself, or at the gateway of the victim’s subnet, or at the proxy of 
a certain domain. It could be implemented as part of an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) 
on a firewall. This part works by detecting and triggering an alarm of DoS attack, filtering 
the incoming traffic and classifying it to normal and attacking, then responding to the attack 
by dropping the attacking packets and blocking the attacking source(s). The specifications 
are: 
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 The detection of DoS attack will be based on SPC methodology to set a threshold for 
a sudden increase in a certain time unit, or a slow rate in the incoming traffic, which 
will trigger an alarm of flooding DoS attack. 
 SIP messages involve two-way communication method based on request and 
response messages; that is, an acknowledged response should be there for each sent 
request. 
 SPDY behaves the same as SIP, in addition to the concept of opening a single TCP 
to retrieve all objects required. 
 Packets classification will be mainly based on the source address as a signature, in 
the case of DDoS, the addresses that appear to be participating in the sudden increase 
of the incoming packets. Other techniques, such as authentication protocol, cookies, 
and Digital Signatures, can be utilised to prevent malicious systems from achieving 
their goal in the attack. 
 As a final default response to the attack, and in case of failure of the classification. 
Sacrificing by a complete block of the incoming attack, and resetting the system, as 
this is the least harmful situation than having the victim under  attack for long periods 
of time.  
 Other issues are raised, like receiving spoofed attacking packets. Any policy against 
spoofed addresses, like blocking, would lead to undesired outcomes. 
Figure 6-2 shows the flowchart of this part; it shows how the flow is tested by the SPC 
techniques, CUSUM and EWMA, if there is an attack then policies are applied and the 
protection continues. 
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Figure 6-2: Inbound traffic monitor 
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 Framework’s Second Part: Outbound Traffic 
Monitor 
This part can be implemented at different locations, i.e. gateways, or routers that support 
SIP and SPDY messages. The system monitors the outgoing traffic; if it detects any 
indication of any attack sourcing one of the agents in the gateway’s network, or a router’s 
sub-network, then it applies a set of policies in order to prevent the attack launched from 
its network towards victims in other networks. An example of such prevention is called D-
WARD in [50]. The solution offered there is applied on the conventional network and the 
internet, and it showed good results in some concepts of DoS attacks, but still has some 
issues, and the defence can be overcome, as some attacks cannot be handled, for example, 
the one-way traffic like it is in UDP communications. The specifications of this part will 
be: 
 This part detects an attack by monitoring the outgoing traffic; if some abnormal 
sending happens, especially from specific sources to specific destinations, this raises 
a suspicion of a DoS attack. If a sudden increase of traffic was not acknowledged, or 
if low partially acknowledged, this is an indication of a flooding DoS attack.  
 If that traffic was fully or highly partially acknowledged, the suspicion will still be 
raised. Meanwhile the gateway of the attacking source sends a notification, i.e. a 
cookie, to the suspected victim’s address containing an indication of an attack 
targeting the victim, and the victim has to respond to the gateway’s notification 
informing that everything is fine and with no indication of a flooding attack. 
 Suspicion will not be raised for long; it is either quickly removed, or leads to trigger 
an alarm of attack as a default action. 
 In addition, this part monitors for any outgoing spoofed addresses packets as well, as 
the spoofing issue in general concludes that there is an important security issue 
happening in the domain or the subnet. In the cases of DoS and DDoS, spoofing helps 
in creating zombies that involve the launching of effective flooding DoS [91] and 
[134]. 
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 After an attack is detected, and triggers the alarm, a set of policies is applied in order 
to prevent the attack from taking an effective role against other inter-networked 
systems.  
 Main policies will include warning the sender, and then block it for a while, until it 
ceases the attack. 
 Collaboration among the network through the routers among the network, or routers 
could be designed just to recognise upper layer protocols’ packet headers. This 
sounds not too practical, as SIP is a higher-layer protocol, but this implies the same 
idea in the 3rd layer switches, these kind of switches help in Virtual Local Area 
Networks (VLAN). 
 
Collaboration is helpful in many cases, such as if the gateway of an attacker was unable to 
detect the flooding attack, for some reasons like simply missing an attack, or even 
incompatibility of the gateway to implement this part of the system. 
Figure 6-3 shows the flow of this part, showing how the flow is examined if there is any 
spoofing of an identity, it is then tested by the SPC techniques CUSUM and EWMA; if 
there is an attack then policies are applied and the protection continues. 
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Figure 6-3: Outbound traffic monitor 
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 Framework’s Components Collaboration 
An important feature of this system, for both parts, is the collaboration among the network 
through the connecting devices in the Internet, i.e. routers and gateways. Collaboration 
between the Inbound and the Outbound parts is helpful in many aspects; a simple scenario 
where an Outbound part on a gateway that is closer to an attacking source was unable to 
detect a flooding attack, this might be for several unexpected reasons such as simply 
missing an attack, or even incompatibility of the gateway to implement this part of the 
system. In the case of an attack being detected on an agent at the edge of a predefined area, 
e.g. an edge router, both Inbound and Outbound methods are implemented, and can be 
applied to protect the region from foreign attacks. But in this case the actual source can be 
difficult to be spotted and stopped, just drop the attacking packets in case the source was 
unknown. 
In Figure 6-1, the Integrated DoS Protection is shown. It illustrates how and where both 
parts are implemented. The location of the protection of each part system plays the main 
role of getting the ultimate results. The Inbound protection system can be implemented 
closer to the victim side. It can be as a firewall for the whole network or as an Intrusion 
Detection System (IDS); this can be implemented as a security system on the SIP Proxy 
Server and SPDY Proxy Server, or the agents and the clients themselves. The Outbound is 
implemented in different strategic locations to the attacking source side, as an outbound 
firewall, or on the gateway or the router, it monitors and detects any abnormal sending. The 
collaboration happens between both parts by sending small size messages and notifications. 
Collaboration is a private communication between the protecting parts on different 
locations; such communications are achieved by the Internet protocols, allowing a higher 
priority among the Internet. Due to the sensitivity of the exchanged information between 
the protection parts, keeping the identities of the communicating agents is an important 
thing, therefore confidentiality techniques are utilised; Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), 
using its ITU-T standard format, the X.509 [135] and [88], is exploited by means of 
Certificate Authority (CA) [59] in order to secure the respective identities of the 
communicating parties. 
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The proposed draft, SPDY, for the new Hyper Text Transfer Protocol (HTTP 2.0) has been 
investigated in this PhD research. The HTTP Secure (HTTPS) which is used to protect web 
traffic from several security vulnerabilities, such as the man in the middle attacks, HTTPS 
runs over the Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Secure Sockets Layer (SSL). HTTPS can 
be utilised in the cooperation between the frameworks parts and notifications transactions, 
especially if an attack was on the web application level. 
A private and safe connection for the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) is offered and it is 
called Secure SIP (SIPs); it uses TLS for secure signalling. Instant Messaging (IM) [38] is 
a service that is offered by the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP). IM offers a real-time text 
transmission over the internet; an extension for SIP to support IM is called the Session 
Initiation Protocol for Instant Messaging and Presence Leveraging Extensions (SIMPLE) 
[51]. IM using SIP is a great service; this framework can be involved in the communication 
between the collaborating parts, especially for its real-time and fast delivery messaging 
feature, any of the protection parts can send an IM to another part in order to exchange 
information for any DoS attack, even it was meanwhile at the suspicion level. 
 Summary 
This chapter has discussed integrated design to protect SIP and from DoS and DDoS 
flooding attacks. The Inbound and Outbound Protection parts work and collaborate together 
in order to detect and protect from any possible way an attacker uses, as well as noting 
spoofing is a serious problem in DDoS, but this system and its collaboration speciality can 
work to prevent spoofing. Each part of the system used the sequential statistical Cumulative 
Summation (CUSUM) and Exponentially Weighted Moving Average (EWMA) to monitor 
the change of any traffic going through. 
Chapter 6 
 
 
126 
  
 Conclusions and Future Work 
 Conclusions 
This thesis has explored the research about detecting Denial of Service (DoS) attacks on 
the Internet’s Application Layer protocols: Session Initiation Protocol (SIP), and SPDY, 
the new proposed HTTP 2.0. The research deployed techniques of Statistical Process 
Control (SPC) and Monitoring charts, Cumulative Summation (CUSUM) and Exponential 
Weighted Moving Average (EWMA), to monitor the traffic behaviour. The techniques 
work by sensing for a sudden increase in traffic, alerting for existence of a flood, then 
detecting and triggering an alarm of DoS attacks.  
There were other scenarios of SIP traffic running; some scenarios were about large 
differences in the ratio of the acknowledged and the non-acknowledged requests, other 
scenarios where there was a slight difference in the increase in the ratio, in addition there 
was another scenario where the traffic is imported. 
In the SPDY scenarios of traffic running, one scenario was about large increases and the 
result of total requests sent by a user; another scenario was with slight increases in the result 
of total requests sent by a user. 
Both CUSUM and EWMA have shown the ability to detect sudden large increases, and 
slow rate DoS attacks; this contributes also to avoid false alarms, as in Figure 4-60: SIP 
second scenario, slight differences, updated EWMA with alert and alarm limits, Figure 
4-61: SIP second scenario, slight differences, zoom at the attack period ( t = [ 95 , 110 ] ), 
Figure 4-62: SIP second scenario, slight differences, zoom at the slight increase,  Figure 
5-23: SPDY Second scenario, slight increase, EWMA with alert and alarm limits, Figure 
5-24: SPDY Second scenario, slight increase, zoom at the attack period, and Figure 5-27: 
SPDY Second scenario, slight increase, a zoom at the attack level. 
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However it was observed that CUSUM is a more effective and powerful technique to detect 
larger increases in the traffic, while EWMA was much more powerful in spotting slight 
changes, or in other words, to detect slow rate attacks and to reduce the false alarms that 
might happen, as shown in the summary, in Figure 4-69  and Figure 5-28. 
SPC techniques were used in two approaches. The first approach by finding the statistical 
values of the whole observations then applying the technique; the second approach was by 
updating statistical values then applying the technique. Both techniques have proved their 
efficiency by showing significant results as in: Figure 4-18, Figure 4-24, Figure 5-26. 
The power of CUSUM and EWMA have encouraged this author to propose a DoS 
resilience framework that offers a strong and complete architecture to protect commuting 
and networking systems from flooding DoS attacks and their related security issues, such 
as identity spoofing. 
 Future Work 
This research allows for open opportunities to develop and research further into the related 
fields. Some future work is listed below: 
 Build and design a consistent framework to a complete protection solution for the 
DoS attacks issue and its related issues. 
 HTTP 2.0 is still under development and investigation, and has not been achieved 
yet; the proposed draft is under review in an attempt to cover all possible security 
vulnerabilities. 
 AJAX is a modern technology that is used extensively in the web’s daily life. In 
accordance with the release of the new HTTP 2.0, new vulnerabilities will be 
discovered that malicious users can easily use for their damaging behaviour, 
especially DoS floods, as it is a very easy attacking strategy to cause the most damage 
and vandalisation to the web and the internet’s resources. 
 Continue in the implementation of the proposed framework from a proposed 
architecture to a real useful tool for connected systems protection. 
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